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compared with suppliers that only sell to domestic brands, the total factor productivity premium is about
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established. Specifically, auto parts suppliers' productivity grows by 25.5 percent in the first year after
formal supply relationships are forged with foreign joint venture automakers, and productivity continues
to grow at least over the next two years. The case study further identifies knowledge transfer from joint
venture automakers as an important source of productivity gains in local suppliers. It also offers three
caveats that need to be taken into account when interpreting the observed productivity externalities in the
econometric analyses.
Chapter 2: Intellectual property piracy is widely believed, by authorities in both U.S. industry and
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volume of paid consumption. We provide direct evidence on both the volume of unpaid consumption and
the rate of sales displacement for movies in China using two surveys administered in late 2008 and
mid-2009. First, using a survey of Chinese college students' movie consumption and an empirical
approach parallel to a similar recent study of U.S. college students, we find that three quarters of movie
consumption is unpaid and that each instance of unpaid consumption displaces 0.14 paid consumption
instances. Second, a survey of online Chinese consumers reveals similar patterns of paid and unpaid
movie consumption but a displacement rate of roughly zero. We speculate on the small displacement rate
finding relative to most of the piracy literature.
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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN RECENT CHINESE
DEVELOPMENT
Jie Bai
Howard Pack

Chapter 1: Earlier studies have consistently found evidence for productivity externalities
of FDI through backward linkages. However, most studies do not use direct measures of
backward linkages, nor do they further investigate what exactly generates these
productivity externalities. Using a unique dataset from the Chinese automotive industry,
which provides direct supply linkage measures, this study shows that compared with
suppliers that only sell to domestic brands, the total factor productivity premium is about
16.7 percent for auto parts suppliers that sell to at least one foreign brand. Employing
difference-in-differences estimation, a causal link from backward linkages to the
suppliers’ productivity growth is also established. Specifically, auto parts suppliers’
productivity grows by 25.5 percent in the first year after formal supply relationships are
forged with foreign joint venture automakers, and productivity continues to grow at least
over the next two years. The case study further identifies knowledge transfer from joint
venture automakers as an important source of productivity gains in local suppliers. It also
offers three caveats that need to be taken into account when interpreting the observed
productivity externalities in the econometric analyses.
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Chapter 2: Intellectual property piracy is widely believed, by authorities in both U.S.
industry and government, to be rampant in China. Because we lack evidence on the rate
at which unpaid consumption displaces paid consumption, we know little about the size
of the effect of pirate consumption on the volume of paid consumption. We provide
direct evidence on both the volume of unpaid consumption and the rate of sales
displacement for movies in China using two surveys administered in late 2008 and mid2009. First, using a survey of Chinese college students’ movie consumption and an
empirical approach parallel to a similar recent study of U.S. college students, we find that
three quarters of movie consumption is unpaid and that each instance of unpaid
consumption displaces 0.14 paid consumption instances. Second, a survey of online
Chinese consumers reveals similar patterns of paid and unpaid movie consumption but a
displacement rate of roughly zero. We speculate on the small displacement rate finding
relative to most of the piracy literature.
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Productivity Externalities of FDI through Backward Linkages with
Local Suppliers: The Case of the Chinese Automotive Industry
1

Introduction
Many countries strive to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), which is taken as

a catalyst for industrial development. Expecting FDI inflows to bring a package of capital,
technology, and management skills, host countries tend to offer multinationals many
favorable conditions, such as subsidies, tax holidays, policy loans, and so on. Extensive
research efforts are devoted to examining FDI externalities and understanding its
mechanisms in order to justify, or to provide guidance for, policy implementation. This
study focuses on a specific kind of FDI externalities, the backward externalities, which
take place when the domestic suppliers’ productivity increases through their interaction
with their downstream multinational customers and the value of these benefits are not
fully internalized by multinationals.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it examines whether the productivity of
local suppliers is enhanced by their backward linkages―partnerships with multinational
affiliates in the host country. The analysis departs from the recent literature by using a
direct measure of backward linkage―whether a local supplier sells to multinational
customers―which is rarely observed in previous studies. This direct backward linkage
measure makes it possible to conduct a causality test to investigate whether foreign
investors in downstream sectors actually bring about the higher productivity levels of
their local suppliers. However, economic policy intervention may not be warranted in
these cases, since the elevated productivity levels associated with backward linkages may
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not necessarily constitute evidence for pure externalities or knowledge spillovers. These
suppliers' productivity may improve for reasons other than knowledge transfer, as Keller
(2010) points out. Therefore, the second goal of this study is to explore the sources of the
observed productivity externalities through backward linkages. Drawing upon fieldwork,
this study first examines how backward linkages manifest themselves in the automotive
industry and focus on various forms of technology transfers from multinational buyers to
their local suppliers. Then concrete measures are provided for cost reduction and
productivity increases in some auto parts suppliers as a direct consequence of knowledge
transfer through backward linkages.
Unlike previous studies that have looked at entire manufacturing sectors,1 this paper
focuses on a particular industry―the Chinese automobile industry―broadly defined as
also including automobile parts and components suppliers. This setting provides two
main advantages for researchers. First, certain features of the automobile industry suggest
it may be a major beneficiary of FDI's externalities through backward linkages. The
flows of FDI in the automotive industry have been among the largest in the
manufacturing sector, and the globalization of production has been most extensive. In the
vertical direction, multinationals worked closely with suppliers in the host country to
increase those suppliers' productivity (Moran 2005). Second, using the richer dataset of
the Chinese automobile component industry, it is possible to overcome the significant
data restrictions faced by earlier researchers. Previously, researchers have lacked detailed

1

To name a few, Javorcik (2004) on Lithuanian manufacturing sectors, Blalock and Gertler (2008) on
Indonesia's manufacturing establishments, and Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2011) on Chinese
manufacturing firms as well as firms that produce and supply electricity, gas, and water.
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information on customer-supplier linkages, resorting to industry input-output tables to
compute an industry-level proxy for the foreign presence in the industries that are being
supplied by a particular industry. This conventional estimator is “best interpreted as the
effect of an increase in the availability of technology on the average productivity of
sellers in a particular industry in a particular region” (Blalock and Gertler 2008, 410).
With firm-specific supply linkage information, it is possible to conduct a direct test as to
whether suppliers selling to multinational car producers are more productive than those
selling to indigenous carmakers. This is a more ideal measure of backward linkage, since
it is based on the actual supply linkages of foreign buyers2 to local suppliers and thus
captures the extent of potential interactions between them.
Two results are presented in the econometric analyses. First, supplier firms’ total
factor productivity is positively correlated with their backward linkages with
multinational buyers. Compared with suppliers that only sell to domestic brands, the total
factor productivity premium is about 16.7 percent for auto parts suppliers that sell to at
least one foreign brand. This productivity premium varies little after adding the control
variables of firm age, agglomeration, and competition; it also remains positive in most
cases across various groups of suppliers according to firm age, foreign ownership,
product categories, and region. Second, a causal link from backward linkages to the
growth of the suppliers’ productivity is established in a productivity trajectory analysis of
suppliers' productivity growth before and after selling to foreign brands. Employing
difference-in-differences estimation, auto parts suppliers’ productivity grows by 25.5

2

In this paper, foreign buyers mean manufactures of foreign brands that are located within China.
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percent in the first year after forging partnerships with foreign brands, and it continues to
grow in the following few years.
Although suppliers’ productivity improves if they are linked with multinational
customers, the econometric analyses do not identify any particular sources of the
observed productivity externalities. Case evidence from a joint venture automotive
manufacturer and several local suppliers is used to supplement the econometric analysis
by providing a real-life picture of knowledge transfer from joint venture automakers to
local suppliers and how the transferred knowledge manifests itself in terms of enhanced
productivity.
The case study identifies knowledge transfer from joint venture automakers as an
important source of productivity gains in local suppliers. First, joint venture automakers
have incentives to transfer technical knowledge and management practice to their
suppliers in the rapid localization process. Second, the knowledge transfer is not a oneway diffusion from foreign investors to their suppliers; instead, it takes many forms both
before and after actual production begins. Specifically, joint venture automakers provide
a combination of direct knowledge transfer, inducement mechanisms for internal efforts,
and platforms on which knowledge can be shared, or even created, through interactions
among suppliers. Third, the examples of two suppliers provide evidence for the suppliers’
enhanced productivity, quality improvement, and cost reduction as direct consequences
of knowledge transfer from their joint venture automakers.
However, three caveats, revealed in the case study, need to be taken into
consideration when interpreting the observed productivity externalities in the
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econometric analyses. First, knowledge transfer from joint venture customers to their
suppliers may be costly; thus knowledge transfer may not constitute externalities. Second,
the case study also finds several other sources of observed productivity externalities
related to backward linkages, which, unlike knowledge spillovers, are not necessarily true
externalities. Third, an important feature about product launch in joint venture
automakers’ local suppliers―a one to two year lag between the procurement contract and
the actual production―is identified in the case study. During this period of time,
substantial knowledge diffusion and absorption could take place, but was not captured in
the econometric analysis. For that reason, the aggregate productivity-enhancing effect of
supplying joint venture automakers tends to be underestimated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on FDI’s
productivity spillovers through backward linkages. Industry background is provided in
Section 3 to explain why unique evidence from the Chinese automobile industry's
experience with FDI helps in addressing the research questions. Section 4 describes the
data and empirical specifications, followed by the econometric results. Section 5 is
devoted to case evidence gathered from industry interviews to explore the sources of
observed productivity externalities through backward linkages. Concluding remarks are
in Section 6.

2

Literature Review
In the literature, researchers have identified multiple channels of productivity

externalities of FDI through backward linkages, but econometric studies—at best—
estimate a combined effect of these channels on local firms’ productivity. Below is a
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review of the multiple channels of productivity externalities of FDI through backward
linkages that researchers have identified. After that, the common econometric method
and proposed possible improvements are described.

2.1 Channels of Productivity Externalities through Backward Linkages
FDI can be a source of productivity externalities, including both pure and pecuniary
externalities. Knowledge spillover is a form of pure externality that the market fails to
take into account. Pecuniary externalities take place through market transactions. A few
theoretical studies have explored the mechanisms of productivity externalities through
backward linkages; some empirical work also has highlighted the importance of
particular mechanisms.
Direct Knowledge Transfer
A number of scholars have argued that multinationals may transfer technology to
suppliers as part of a strategy to build an efficient, high quality supply base in the host
economy (to name a few, Javorcik 2004; Pack and Saggi 2001). However, if the benefits
of knowledge transfer are internalized through input price reduction or direct consultant
payment, the transferred knowledge does not generate productivity externalities. Thus, it
is necessary to examine the features of knowledge transfer when relating it to pure
externality. Pack and Saggi (2001) propose a mechanism through which knowledge
transfer from multinationals may generate social benefits. They suggest that
multinationals may have incentives to diffuse technology deliberately to upstream
vendors besides their original suppliers. The wide diffusion of the technology would
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encourage entry into the supplier market so that these multinationals may reap the
benefits of increased competition and a reduced input price in the upstream sector.
Competitive pressure
Enhanced competition in the consumer good market forces suppliers to engage more
in innovative activity and to improve productivity, but competitive effects differ among
suppliers. Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (2003) find that downstream FDI by Japanese
auto manufacturers by and large has a positive effect on upstream suppliers in the US
automotive components industry, but tie-in relationships did not particularly increase the
productivity of supplier firms. Without systematic analysis, Chung et al. simply attribute
competitive pressure as the primary cause of overall productivity growth.
Demand-scale effect
The entry of multinationals creates demands for domestic intermediate goods
providers. Under an assumption of increasing returns to scale, the productivity of local
firms would rise as they spread their fixed costs over a larger market, helping them move
down their average cost curves (Markusen and Venables 1999). Javorcik (2004) estimates
this scale effect by including the demand for intermediates calculated from information
on sourcing patterns from the input and output matrix as well as the value of production
in using sectors. She finds a positive correlation between demand in downstream sectors
and firm productivity.
Input variety
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) proposes another mechanism through which the demand
created by multinational may enhance local suppliers’ productivity. He assumes that there
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is love of variety for inputs in the production of final goods and that inputs are produced
with increasing returns to scale. This increased demand for inputs allows a final-good
firm to create a greater variety of specialized inputs, and this in turn leads to an increase
in the productivity of domestic suppliers. Compared to local final-good firms,
multinationals are more likely to generate a positive linkage effect because the products
multinationals produce are more complex.
Quality Linkage
Javorcik (2004) mentions another channel of positive productivity externality from
MNCs to suppliers. Multinationals impose more stringent quality requirements for
process and product, providing incentives for domestic suppliers to improve their
technologies or management. In their interviews, Rodriguez-Clare and Alfaro (2004) find
that local firms had decided to upgrade the quality of their production processes in order
to become MNC suppliers, even though these upgrades required significant investment.
Presumably, the quality upgrading by suppliers would be reflected in an increase in their
measured total factor productivity (TFP).

2.2 Review of Current Econometric Methodology
The general empirical model specified below is the most frequently encountered in
econometric tests of FDI spillovers through backward linkages. The empirical strategy is
to calculate a backward linkage measure and to examine the correlation between firm’s
productivity and the linkage measure. A positive coefficient on the backward linkage
measure is interpreted as positive FDI spillovers through backward linkages.
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For example, consider a foreign-invested automaker (the buyer) and a local bumper
producer. Suppose that selling bumpers to the foreign-invested automaker improves the
bumper producer's productivity. It could be the case when the automaker assists its
bumper suppliers at a cost below market value, or when the pressure from the automaker
elicits best efforts from its bumper supplier. Regardless of the mechanisms, the enhanced
productivity due to customer relationships with foreign-invested producers is counted as
positive FDI spillovers through backward linkages.
As Gorg and Strobl (2005) argue, such an empirical specification does not consider
spillover channels explicitly. Any externalities from interactions between suppliers and
their customers of foreign brands are accounted for in the production function estimation.
The coefficient on the backward linkage measure picks up a net effect of FDI―a
combined effect of knowledge transfer, competition, scale effect, and linkage effects, as
reviewed above.3
(1)

stands for the real output of firm operating in sector at time , which is usually
calculated by priced-adjusted production output or value added.

is defined as the

value of fixed assets at the beginning of the year, deflated by investment price index.
is the total number of employees; it is also expressed in terms of efficiency units, which
are computed by dividing the wage bill by the minimum wage (B. S. Javorcik 2004). In

3

Some attempts are made to control competition effect and demand effect. For example, the Herfindahl
index is included as a proxy for the level of industry concentration. The demand for intermediates is
calculated based on information on sourcing patterns from the input-output matrix and the value of
production in certain sectors (Javorcik 2004; Liu 2008).
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some cases,

measures of materials are also included in the specifications. Backward

linkage is measured by the share of the total output of an industry that is sold to
downstream foreign buyers across all industries. Specifically, it is defined as in Blalock
and Gertler (2008) and (B. S. Javorcik 2004):

where

is a proxy for horizontal spillovers, represents the proportion of the

total output of a given industry in a given year4 produced by all foreign affiliates. It is
defined as below:

This captures the extent of foreign presence in sector at time and assumes that
technology spillovers from foreign firms to local rivals increase when there is an increase
in either the output of foreign investment enterprises or the share of foreign equity in
these firms.
is the proportion of sector j′s output supplied to sector k. The common approach
to approximating

is to use the input-output coefficients taken from the host country’s

input-output tables. These tables show the amount that firms in one industry purchase
from each of the other industries. Together with the information on the share of output in

4

Sometimes the horizontal spillover measure varies across regions as well. In that case, a local market is
assumed, so that any technology spillover from foreign firms to local rivals most likely only occurs among
firms that are geographically close. That assumption holds when regions are geographically isolated. It is
true in the case of Indonesia, where poor inter-region transportation infrastructure is rather constrained by
its vast island geography (Blalock and Gertler 2008).

11
industry j that is produced by foreign-owned firms (horizontal spillover measures), a
measure of backward linkage can be constructed, which is the sum of the output shares
purchased by other industries multiplied by the share of foreign output in each purchasing
industry.
Instead of being a direct measure of potential spillovers through backward linkages,
as Blalock and Gertler (2008) point out, this industry-level measure captures “the
availability of buyers’ foreign technology to sellers in a particular industry” (p. 410). This
measurement choice, adopted by almost every prior paper in the literature, is largely
driven by the data limitations because researchers rarely observe the specific supply
relationship from local suppliers to foreign investors, not to mention the intensity of
knowledge flow.
This industry-level linkage measure has some limitations which may result in
measurement errors. First, the input-output tables are compiled for the entire national
economy, usually every five years. Most studies use coefficients in one such table for
computing backward linkage measures across years. Thus

varies only across

industries. In some cases, the backward linkage measures are defined at 20 NACE 2-digit
industries (B. S. Javorcik 2004). The most disaggregated level can be up to 145
manufacturing industries (Lileeva 2010).
Second, this industry-level measure is built upon several strong assumptions that are
very likely to be violated in reality. These assumptions include the following: 1) the share
of firms’ demand in a sector for a particular input is proportional to its output share. This
assumption follows directly from using output as weight in the horizontal linkage
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measure

; 2) the input sourcing pattern is invariant across domestic firms

and foreign multinationals of different nationalities. This assumption is the result of using
input-output coefficients as demand measures of intermediate product (as in

). Barrios,

Görg, and Strobl (2011) argue against the validity of these assumptions. Rodriguez-Clare
and Alfaro (2004) also provide evidence that multinationals’ sourcing patterns are not the
same as those of domestic firms. Biased linkage measure could potentially lead to biased
estimates of the impact of backward linkages on productivity; moreover, there is no clear
prior knowledge regarding the direction of the bias.
Recent studies find evidence for prominent productivity externalities through
backward linkages from downstream foreign firms to upstream suppliers. Using panel
data for Lithuania from 1996 through 2000, Javorcik (2004) finds evidence for the
existence of productivity externalities from FDI taking place through contacts between
foreign affiliates and their local suppliers in upstream sectors. Specifically, a onestandard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in the sourcing sectors is associated
with a 15-percent rise in output of each domestic firm in the supplying industry. Blalock
and Gertler (2008) find the evidence for positive backward externalities in Indonesian
manufacturing establishments from 1988 through 1996. Firm output increases almost 9%
as the share of foreign ownership downstream rises from zero to one. Two recent papers
that investigate vertical FDI spillovers by Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2011) and Lin,
Liu, and Zhang (2009) focus particularly on Chinese manufacturing sectors. Using an
empirical approach similar to Javorcik (2004), both of the studies find a positive and
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much larger backward linkage spillover effect than was found in previous studies of other
countries.
In contrast to studies using industry-level backward linkage measures, two papers
stand out by employing direct measures of backward linkages. Javorcik and Spatareanu
(2009) combine firm-level panel data on balance sheets with an enterprise survey that
identifies the specific supplying relationships with MNCs. With direct measures, they are
able to distinguish self-selection from learning effects. Using Probit and Linear
Probability models, they find that more productive firms are more likely to supply MNCs.
Using an IV approach, they find evidence for Czech suppliers learning from their
relationships with multinational customers. Most specifications suggest that MNC
suppliers are 12%-15% more productive than other firms.
Focusing on the US auto-component industry, Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (2003)
carefully identify firm-specific supply relationships between Japanese auto-transplants
and their local US component suppliers, what they called “tie-in” relationships. Their
findings stand in stark contrast to Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) and the aforementioned
studies using industry-level linkage measures. First, they find evidence for adverse
selection: tie-in firms tended to be less productive than non-tie-in firms before tie-in
relationships began, suggesting that transplants chose less productive local firms as
suppliers. Second, they found no evidence for direct technology transfer. US firms that
supplied Japanese manufacturers did not increase productivity more than suppliers that
did not contract with Japanese buyers.
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The different results probably arise from the fact that Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung
(2003) study the US automotive industry, where the advanced state of physical
technology reduces the potential for technology transfer, while Javorcik and Spatareanu
(2009) study the manufacturing sectors in a developing country, where levels of both
physical technology and production methods are relatively low compared to their foreign
entrants.

3

FDI in the Chinese Automobile Sector and the Development of Local
Suppliers
The Chinese automobile industry is an attractive setting for research on FDI’s

spillovers from backward linkages for two reasons. First, the Chinese automobile
industry received a tremendous amount of foreign investment in past three decades,
which played a crucial role for the sector development. Second, local supply linkages
have become rather extensive, thanks to FDI and local efforts. Thus, it is more likely to
generate productivity spillovers, if there are any, through backward linkages.
There are two developmental stages of auto industry. The first, beginning from early
1980s, is a combination of trade protection, openness to FDI, and local content
requirements. Since a few years before access to WTO, it gradually moves away from the
protectionist approach and invites competition, both domestic and international, to be the
transforming force in the industry.
From 1982 to 2013, China accumulatively absorbed a total of $2557.1 billion in FDI.
For many years in the 1990s, China claimed to be the world’s second largest recipient of
FDI; since 2009, China has surpassed the United States in terms of net FDI inflows
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(World Development Indicators 2015). Reliance on foreign investment is the defining
feature of the development path of the Chinese automobile sector. China opened the
domestic market in exchange for technology and managerial skills embodied in foreign
investment (Thun 2006, 63).
As China began to open itself to world trade in the late 1970s, multinational firms
were lured by the China’s population and market potential. A distinct feature of FDI in
the Chinese auto sector is “market-seeking”, as Thun (2006) puts it. As Chinese citizens’
disposable income increased dramatically since early 1980s, they desired to have cars in
their consumption bundle. Previously prohibited from using private vehicles, government
officials began to enjoy the privilege to use cars. In addition, China then began to open
itself to international tourism and foreign business. All these contributed to an increasing
demand for taxis and other passenger cars (Harwit 2001).
Besides openness to foreign direct investment, the Chinese auto sector had initially
been nurtured in a protectionist environment before entering the WTO. Foreign investors
can produce automobiles in China only through partnership with state-owned enterprises;
and foreign ownership is restricted to less than 50% (State Planning Committee 1994, art.
32). This gives the Chinese partners leverage to negotiate for technology transfer as part
of any agreement. In addition, tariffs were as high as 200% in the 1980s and, with import
quotas, only 30,000 vehicles were annually allowed from foreign carmakers. Foreign
participation was also constrained in sales and distribution (Gao 2002, 148).
Believing that a rapidly rising local content rate was a key factor in the early success
of joint venture automakers, the government began concerted efforts on localization.
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Local content requirements (LCRs), one of such efforts, were embedded in China’s
approach to the automobile industry. The LCR policy was designed to create
technological linkages to the component industries. It combined with a varied tariff rates
according to the local content ratio of assembled vehicles. For passenger cars whose local
contents exceeded 80%, the tariff rate on imported parts and components is 40%; for
local contents of 60%-80% and below 60%, the tariff is 60% and 75%, respectively
(Zhang 1997, 389).
It would be futile to pressure joint venture automakers to use local parts if local
suppliers could not provide components of the desired quality. Some municipal
governments made combined efforts to create local supply capabilities. In Shanghai, a
Localization Office was formed directly underneath the mayor’s office to deal with the
local supply sector on a daily basis. The Office identified the most likely components to
be replaced by local factories, selected potentially capable factories, and worked with
managers of supply firms who hoped to form linkages with Shanghai Santana through
upgrading their technical capabilities.5 Moreover, it provided supply firms with access to
investment funds at preferential rates to import foreign technology and equipment. The
massive funds were collected through the so-called “localization tax,” which was levied
by the Shanghai government and was amounted to 16 percent of Santana’s retail price at
the time. Between 1988 and 1994, the localization tax in Shanghai reached over RMB 5
billion (Huang 2003, 266). The Localization Office was extremely effective in helping
local suppliers manufacture components that met Santana’s standards.

5

For detailed description of the Localization Office, see Thun (2006, 110-117).
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The technical standards of Chinese automobile component suppliers in mid-1980s
were three decades behind international component suppliers. As the managing director
of Shanghai Volkswagen claimed, “in the beginning there wasn’t a single local parts
supplier which could produce a part we could assemble into the Santana.” (People’s
Daily Press 1988). Despite the low starting point, the manufacturing capability of the
supply sectors increased sharply over the course of the next decade. As Table 1 shows,
local content rates of various JV brands began to rise very quickly. Shanghai Santana
achieved the highest possible local content rate, 92.9%, in 1997.6 Thun (2006) points out
that a virtuous circle links production volumes to the health of a supply network: “local
suppliers made it possible to raise volumes (due to restrictions on foreign exchange) and
high volumes created the economies of scale that made a components business viable.”
Initially nurtured in a highly protective environment, the Chinese automotive industry
was gradually exposed to increasing domestic competition as a result of a dramatic
increase in FDI and impending accession to the WTO. By 2006, import tariffs were cut
from 100% to 25% for passenger cars and from 24% to 10% for auto components. Quotas
on automobile imports would be phased out by 2005 (UNCTAD 2000, 54). Although
trade barriers were not lowered until 2005, an increase in the number of joint ventures
raised the level of domestic competition. After Beijing Jeep and Shanghai Volkswagen
became the first two joint-venture car producers in 1983, major global car producers
followed their steps and set up production facilities in China in the following two decades
(see Figure 1).

6

The local content rate would not rise above this percentage because the remaining 7% consisted of parts
that were used in volumes too small to be produced economically in China (Thun 2006, 105).
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Figure 1: Entry Timeline of Joint Venture Brands: 1984-2004.
Increased domestic competition brought down the price of automobiles considerably
in China. Nearly every car brand reduced its selling price (China Economic Information
Network 2004, 48-50). The price of a Volkswagen Jetta, had fallen by one-third in the
past three years since 2002, to 100,000 yuan ($12,000) in late 2004 (Economist 2005).
Competitive forces became an impetus for supply firms to raise productivity and to
reduce prices constantly. In the highly competitive environment, assembly plants were
facing many alternatives which did not exist in the initial stage. If a supplier did not meet
the quality, price, and service needs of a customer, the assembly could import the
necessary components or turn to wholly foreign-owned suppliers. The data sample in the
following analysis, ranging from 1998 to 2004, covers this competitive development
period.
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4

Econometric Analysis

4.1 Data Sources
The analysis here is based on data from the China Automotive Industry Yearbook
(CAIY).7 Since the early 1990s, the China Automotive Technology & Research Center
(CATARC) has conducted an annual cross-industry survey of automotive manufactures,
including automakers and their automobile parts suppliers. CAIY’s last chapter is
devoted to an enumeration of thousands of automotive manufacturers. Variables include
output, value added, assets, and employment, which are ingredients to compute firms’
total factor productivity. Most importantly, the data set contains unique information as to
which brands each supplier made sales. It is the key to constructing direct backward
linkage measures. In addition, the CAIY data set is supplemented with the China Annual
Survey of Manufacturing Firms (CASMF) database, which covers firms’ characteristics
information, such as founding year, ownership (state-owned, joint venture, or foreignowned, and so on), and industrial classifications. Additional characteristics information is
available for about one half of the suppliers in the data sample. The analysis covers the
years, 1998 to 2004, a period of time when these variables were recorded consistently.8
The panel data set consists of 1,017 supplier firms in 3,450 firm-year combinations. A
complete summary of variables can be found in Table A. 1.

7

CAIY is published by the China Automotive Technology & Research Center (CATARC) and the China
Association of Automotive Manufacturers (CAAM).
8

The analysis here focuses on the period between 1998 and 2004. The sample size jumps dramatically
from year 1997 to 1998; since then, the number of respondents constantly remained at over 2,000. In
addition, staring from 2005, only employment level, revenue, and supplying brands are listed. Lack of input
(asset) and output (value added) information prohibits computing firms’ productivity.
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The CAIY data set does not specify whether a domestically manufactured automobile
brand is produced by a joint venture automaker or a domestic one. Thus a mapping table
was compiled, connecting hundreds of brands with their manufacturers and sorting these
brands and automakers according to their characteristics.9 Key information includes
whether a brand is a foreign brand10 or indigenous one and whether an automaker is
domestic or a joint venture with a foreign car producer.
Although the automobile manufacturing industry is broadly defined as including
passenger car producers, commercial car producers, motorcycles producers, and car
remodeling companies, analysis is limited within a sample of suppliers of passenger cars.
Given the fact that the majority of foreign direct investment takes place in the production
of passenger cars, if there are productivity spillovers, firms supplying passenger car firms
are most likely to be the beneficiaries. Therefore, when interpreting the spillover results,
the estimate is an upper bound of backward productivity spillover effect.

4.2 Empirical Framework
In order to identify the effect of supplying a joint venture automaker on productivity,
this study examines whether auto component suppliers which have a supplier relationship
with joint venture automakers were more productive, ceteris paribus. This effect is
estimated using log-linear production functions at the firm level with backward linkage
measures and a few dummies. The production function controls for input levels and scale

9

The information about brands and automakers are hand-collected from online public sources.

10

Here, “foreign brand” is defined as a brand available outside China’s domestic market.
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effects. Fixed-effects models of the form are estimated on a sample of auto component
and parts suppliers:
(2)

where the dependent variable is log output of firm
added.

and

indicate capital and labor of firm

at time
at time

, proxied by firms’ value
, proxied by end-of-

year total assets and end-of-year total employment. Value added and total assets are
nominal values deflated to 1991 RMB.11 In addition to backward linkage measures
all estimates include a fixed effect

,

for firm , that control for time-invariant

unobservable firm characteristics, such as managerial ability, and year dummies

, that

control for changes common to all firms in a particular year. Most models also include
linear province trends―the province-by-year dummy variables―to control for changes
common to all supplier firms in a province at a particular time. These province-specific
time trends take into account the uneven economic development across provinces. They
control for any shocks that affect all firms in a given province equally. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level to correct within-firm serial correlation.

4.3 Direct Backward Linkage Measures
A unique feature of the CAIY dataset of the China’s automobile industry is supplierbuyer linkage information. In each single year between 1998 and 2004, we observe that
automobile parts and component suppliers sold certain intermediate products to some
automobile brands or automakers. Thus it is possible to construct direct measures of
backward linkage between part suppliers and the auto brands to which they sold. One of
11

Total asset is deflated by the price index for investment in fixed assets, and value added is deflated by the
producer price index for manufactured goods to the price level of 1991.
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such linkage measures is the so-called minimum linkage of foreign brands, an indicator
which equals one if the supplier sold to at least one domestically produced foreign brand
in a particular year. Figure 2 shows that over half of suppliers sold to at least one foreign
brand and over sixty percent sold to at least one joint venture automaker. The ratio
remained rather stable during the period of 1998 and 2004.
Percentage of Suppliers to Foreign Brands or JV Automakers
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Figure 2: Changes of Minimum Linkage Measures over Years, 1998-2004
By using the minimum linkage measure, it is assumed that the effect of interacting
with foreign auto brands is similar across auto component suppliers, no matter how many
foreign brands to which they sold. This is apparently a very strong assumption.
Presumably, the more frequent the interactions with foreign brands, the higher the
benefits are (if there are any).
Linkage intensity, the second linkage measure, intends to capture the intensity of
interactions between suppliers and its foreign customers. In the data, the interaction
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intensity is measured by the number of foreign brands which a supplier sells to in a
particular year.12 This assumes the effect of foreign linkages is linear, while most benefits
may occur during the initial cooperation experience with a foreign brand. The physical
amount of sold auto products is not used because hundreds of components are not
comparable without converting to monetary terms, and component prices are not
available.
Each automobile brand corresponds to a certain automaker. It should be noted that not
every foreign brand is produced by a joint venture automaker. A couple of foreign brands
are actually produced by domestic automakers under licensing agreements; thus the
nature of the interaction is different from those with joint venture carmakers.13 In order to
check whether the linkage effects differ between joint venture automakers and foreign
brands, another set of linkage measures are also included. The minimum linkage measure
of joint venture automakers is an indicator of whether a supplier sold to a joint venture
automaker, while the linkage intensity measure of joint venture automakers is the number
of joint venture automakers to which a supplier sells.

12

It is almost impossible to measure precisely the interaction intensity in firm-level data, because it could
be of many dimensions. In one case, an automaker may send a task-force team to a local component
supplier to assist them to build up production capacity; in another case, suppliers are regularly summoned
by their customer to keep up with up-to-date quality standard or operation practice. In both cases, a certain
amount of technical knowledge is transferred to suppliers and potentially improves their productivity. But
this level of detailed information can only exist in survey data or case study.
13

For instance, the Daihatsu Terios was made in China under license by FVW-Huali, a domestic subsidiary
of FVW. Another example is that Changfeng Motor, a Chinese state-owned automobile manufacturer, has
produced license built the Mitsubishi Pajero, sold in China under the Mitsubishi brand.
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4.4 Initial Estimates
Initial estimates of the equations are found in Table 2. Each column presents a
regression of the log of supplier firms’ output on inputs, firm and time dummies,
province time trend (in even-numbered columns), and minimum linkage measures, which
are equal to one if a given supplier firm is associated with at least one foreign brand or
joint venture automaker in a given year, and zero otherwise. The first two columns
contain the estimated impact of selling to at least one foreign brand on supplier firms’
productivity level. The coefficient of 0.117 in column 1 indicates that after removing
time-invariant firm fixed effect and common year effects, firm productivity grew by
approximately 11.7 percent more in suppliers selling to at least one foreign brand. The
second column adds 2714 province-specific time trends to the model, increasing the point
estimate slightly to 16.6 percent and reducing the SE. An F-test of the hypothesis that the
province trends are jointly zero is strongly rejected by the data; hence these province
trends are employed in most specifications.
Comparable models estimated with linkage measures of joint venture automakers are
found in columns 3-4. The point estimates present similar patterns: firms selling to at
least one joint venture automaker are approximately 7 percent more productive than
suppliers to domestic automakers (col. 3). The premium increases to 18.5 percent when
province trends are included (col. 4). Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 estimate the impact
of the two linkage measure simultaneously. The point estimate for linkage measure of

14

There are 34 provincial level administrative divisions in China, including 22 provinces, 4 municipalities,
5 autonomous regions, and 2 special administrative regions. The data sample contains observations of 27
provincial divisions.
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joint venture automaker is only minimally affected by the inclusion of the other linkage
measure. Its coefficient of 14.3 remains robust after controlling province trends. By
contrast, the linkage measure of foreign brands appears less important to supplier firms’
productivity, even after including province trends. The last two columns of Table 2 show
that merely having any of the two minimum linkage measures has a significant impact on
supplier firms’ productivity.

4.5 Estimates with a Varity of Linkage Measures
The results in Table 2 suggest that association with at least one foreign brand or JV
automaker has a positive impact on supplier firms’ productivity. Do suppliers associated
with more foreign brands demonstrate higher productivity? Do automakers under
technology licensing agreement with foreign brands generate backward linkage spillovers
to their parts suppliers? These questions are addressed in this subsection, which begins
with the specification from columns 2 and 4 of Table 2, and then introduces in Table 3 a
variety of measures of backward linkages between automobile part suppliers and their
joint venture customers. The second and fifth columns of Table 3 show that merely
associating with more foreign brands or joint venture automakers does not necessarily
improve suppliers’ productivity. Indeed, the first relationship with either a foreign brand
or a JV automaker improves auto parts suppliers’ productivity (col.3 and col.6); the
productivity effect is even more enhanced with connection to a second foreign brand.
However, selling to three or more brands or JV automakers does not have a significant
impact on suppliers’ productivity. This diminishing feature of the backward linkage
effect provides a glimpse of evidence that suppliers may learn through interactions with
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their customers. If the self-selection hypothesis dominates, there would be a positive
relationship between parts suppliers’ productivity and the number of foreign brands or JV
automakers to which they sold. Column 7 of Table 3 reveals that selling to a brand under
technology licensing agreement has little impact on parts suppliers’ productivity; merely
having any of the three minimum linkages has no impact either (col.8). It appears that the
linkage measure of brands and automakers―as opposed to the license linkage
measure―matters.

4.6 Estimates by Supplier Firm’s Ownership, Age, Region, and
Intermediate Product Category
The robustness of the results was tested by estimating over a variety of subgroups
according to supplier firms’ ownership structure, firm age, region, and their product
category. Estimates are found in table 4-6. A first specification check explores whether
backward linkage spillover effects differ between domestic and foreign-invested parts
suppliers.15 Results of Table 4 show that domestic suppliers to foreign brands or JV
automakers are more productive than other domestic suppliers (col.1 and 3); while in the
group of foreign-invested parts suppliers, the correlation is higher, but insignificant (col.2
and 4). There is no strong evidence that foreign ownership matters for spillovers through
backward linkages. Capital coefficients of foreign-owned suppliers is as high as 0.58,
while it is only 33 percent in domestic suppliers. It is interesting that a wide range of
capital intensity level is maintained among suppliers, regardless of the low wage rate in

15

Foreign-funded companies include Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative joint
ventures, foreign wholly owned enterprises, and foreign investment companies limited by shares. In this
analysis, Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan-Invested (HKMT firm) companies are also included in this category.
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China. As (Sutton 2005) points out, a low level of capital intensity makes it more difficult
to reach acceptable quality standards. On the one hand, in order to make sales to foreign
brands of higher quality requirements, suppliers need to attain some threshold level of
capital intensity, however low the local wage level. On the other hand, for suppliers of
domestic brands, they can take advantage of low wage rate, because domestic brands
usually require a less demanding quality standard.
Do backward linkage spillovers exist in a particular age group of parts suppliers?
Column 1 of Table 5 adds the supply firm’s age16 to the baseline specification. The point
estimate of 0.513 indicates that older supplier firms are more productive than younger
ones. By adding a quadratic age variable in column 2, it becomes clear that productivity
grows at an increasing rate as supplier firms become older. In columns 3-5, separate
production function estimations with backward linkage measures are made by three age
groups. Old suppliers are those established before 1970, the middle-aged are between
1970 and 1995, and young suppliers are after 1995. 1970 and 1995 are the two cutoff
points of firm age tertile. Results show that, in spite of being more productive than young
suppliers (col.1), productivity spillovers through backward linkages in old suppliers are
no greater than in young suppliers (col.3 and 5). The spillover effect is less by half in
middle-aged suppliers than in young ones. In Table A. 2, another linkage measure of
automakers shows a significantly positive coefficient only within the group of young
suppliers, indicating that productivity of young suppliers associated with JV automakers
are more productive than their counterparts only associated with domestic automakers.

16

Firm age is calculated as one plus the number of years between the founding year and the year of
observation.
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Apparently young suppliers are major beneficiaries of backward linkage spillovers. They
could adjust and learn faster from their multinational customers.
The data is subdivided to check the consistency of positive productivity spillovers
through backward linkages. Two such tests are discussed here. The top panel of Table 6
presents estimates of the baseline model across subgroups of five intermediate product
categories. The point estimates present a consistent picture: the coefficient of the
backward linkage measure is positive in four out of five categories. In the lower panel of
Table 6 are estimates of the base specification for each of the six geographic regions.
Results show that in four of six regions, parts suppliers selling to at least one foreign
brand are more productive than those selling only to domestic brands. In Table A. 3, the
minimum linkage measure of JV automakers shows similar patterns across five
intermediate product categories and seven regions.

4.7 Exploring the Agglomeration and Competition Effect
This subsection concentrates on two other factors which may influence parts suppliers’
productivity, agglomeration and competition. Agglomeration economies are generally
assumed to improve firms’ productivity through economies that come from localization
and urbanization. The former, proposed by Marshall (1920), focuses on the geographical
concentration of an industry. The latter emphasizes the importance of urban diversity,
which fosters cross fertilizations of different industries within a geographical area (Jacobs
1969). Localization is often proxied by the amount of employment in neighboring firms
in the same industry and same area (Holmes 1999; Martin, Mayer, et al. 2011).
Specifically,
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Localization economies: to deal with intra-industry externalities. It is defined as the
number of other employees working in the same industry in the same area.

Index , , , , represents firm, sector, county, and time respectively.


Urbanization economies: to capture the scale of economic activity outside own
industry.

Predictions of the theoretical literature on the impact of competition on productivity
are ambiguous. Competition may force firms to innovate or fail (Porter 1990). In this
view, competitive pressure improves productivity. On the other hand, competition may
decrease productivity because of incomplete appropriation of the returns from innovation
(Glaeser et al. 1992). The inverse of Herfindahl index measures the competition effect.
The Herfindahl index of industry , region , time is defined as below,

To construct agglomeration and competition variables, employment and sales
information of firms are needed within the same industry and outside the industry of
suppliers in the same geographical area. Thus, the original CAIY data was merged with
the Chinese Manufacturing Firms Annual Survey data set according to firm names; the
latter includes all state-owned enterprises and non-stated firms with annual sales of more
than 5 million Yuan.17 After merging, the sample size was reduced from 2,985 to 1,902,

17

The number of firms per year varies from 162,033 in 1999 to 276,474 in 2004.
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and the reduction is biased towards smaller firms18 due to the sampling strategy of the
manufacturing firm survey.
The baseline specification was considered over a matched subsample of parts
suppliers. Coefficients of linkage measures (col.1 and 5 of Table 7) are slightly different
from the full sample estimation in columns 2 and 6 of Table 2. Table 7 introduces the
agglomeration and competition variables. Columns 2 and 6 show that increasing the
number of other workers of the same industry-area by 10% (localization) and keeping the
size of the other sectors in the area constant decreases supplier firms’ productivity by
0.3%. Urbanization appears to have little impact on firms’ productivity. Competition is
added in columns 3 and 7. The coefficient of competition is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that more competition is associated with productivity
improvement, consistent with Nickell (1996) that competition tends to increase total
factor productivity growth. Furthermore, including a measure of competition in the
estimation significantly reduces the importance of localization externalities. To test
whether competition effect varies according to backward linkages, an interaction term
between competition and backward linkage measures is added in columns 4 and 8.
Interestingly, although it is possible that competitive pressure may extend beyond
passenger car industry to its supply sectors, the insignificant coefficients on the
interaction terms indicate that the productivity-enhancing impact of competition is no

18

Comparing output, labor, asset and JV linkage between preserved and deleted observations due to sample
merge, it is found that the unmatched firms tend to be smaller in terms of output and inputs and less likely
to be a supplier of foreign brands.
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greater among suppliers selling to foreign brands than those who only sold to domestic
brands; rather, competition exerts positive influence on suppliers in general.

4.8 Inferring Causality via the Timing of Becoming Suppliers to Foreign
Brands
The estimations above show that auto parts suppliers to foreign brands are more
productive than their counterparts to domestic brands. But the positive correlation does
not necessarily imply that becoming suppliers of foreign brands causes productivity gains.
Plausible arguments can be made for reverse causality: relatively more productive parts
suppliers are more likely to be selected by foreign brands which hold higher productivity
and quality requirements for their local suppliers. To explore this possibility, a
difference-in-differences model is estimated to compare a group of parts suppliers which
only began to sell to foreign brands between 1998 and 2004 (new suppliers to foreign
brands) with a group of suppliers which only sold to domestic brands, augmented with
leads and lags of their supply status change. Specifically, indicator variables were added
for 1, 2, and 3 years before they began to sell to foreign brands, years 0-2 after selling to
foreign brands, and year 3 forward.
The first column of Table 8 presents the base specification, using foreign brand
linkage measures, augmented with the leads and lags. Three interesting findings emerge.
First, the coefficients on the entrance leads are significantly positive, showing evidence
for selection; that is, foreign brands tend to select more productive suppliers of domestic
brands. Second, in the year immediately before selling to foreign brands, suppliers’
productivity drops close to zero, after which it increases substantially by 25.5%. Third,

32
over the subsequent 3 and more years after interacting with their multinational customers,
these parts suppliers’ productivity continues to grow by a rate between 42.9% and 68.6%.
An F-test of the hypothesis that these entrance lags are jointly zero is strongly rejected by
the data, indicating that these new suppliers of foreign brands improve in their
productivity through interactions with their multinational customers. This pattern is
depicted by Figure 3. The subsequent columns of Table 8 repeat the above estimates,
using JV automaker linkage measures and over a subsample of domestic suppliers. The
pattern of coefficients is comparable in each case, only not as statistically significant as
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Figure 3: Estimated impact of backward linkages on supplier firms’ productivity for
years before, during, and after suppliers began to sell to foreign brands
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In summary, the suppliers’ total factor productivity is found to be positively
correlated with their linkages with foreign investors. This positive correlation is robust
across various age groups, foreign ownership groups, product categories, and regions. In
the following productivity trajectory analysis, there is evidence of both selection and
learning. On the one hand, foreign brands tend to select more productive suppliers as
their local partners; on the other hand, suppliers’ productivity is enhanced after they
began selling to foreign brands.
Even though the firm-level backward linkage measures can capture a direct
connection between local suppliers and foreign investors, the econometric analyses
provide limited information about the sources of the observed productivity externalities.
Moreover, the backward linkage measures at most indicate a potential for knowledge
transfer; real knowledge transferred through interactions between suppliers and their
foreign customers is rarely observable in data. Thus, the econometric analyses only offer
indirect evidence for the knowledge transfer that may enhance suppliers’ productivity.

5

Sources of the Observed Productivity Externalities through
Backward Linkages: A Case Study
In the above econometric analyses, substantial productivity improvement is found in a

group of local auto component suppliers to be related to their linkages with joint venture
automakers. The next question is what exactly generates these productivity externalities
suggested by the econometric analyses in here as well as earlier studies in the literature.
Using a case study approach, this section aims to develop a more nuanced understanding
of the sources of the observed productivity externalities through backward linkages.
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It begins with a simple production function framework and demonstrates that the
estimated productivity externalities in the common production estimation approach not
only include knowledge spillovers, but several other factors as well. These are suppliers’
internal efforts to improve productivity without their foreign customers’ assistance, and
the price and cost reduction of intermediate product sold to foreign customers. Therefore,
the observed productivity externalities should not simply be attributed to knowledge
spillovers without taking these other factors into account. Furthermore, knowledge
spillover is not readily observable in the data. What we at best observe is whether a
supplier is connected with a foreign customer and the result of such a connection in terms
of enhanced productivity.
Drawing upon fieldwork at one joint venture automaker and several auto component
and parts suppliers in China, this section establishes a concrete link between knowledge
transfer through backward linkages and productivity improvement. Specifically, it
addresses the following questions. First, do joint venture automakers transfer knowledge
to their local suppliers? Second, what are the forms of these knowledge transfers? Third,
do these knowledge transfers directly translate into local suppliers’ productivity growth?
In addition, other sources of the observed productivity externalities are found to be
important in the interactions between local component suppliers and their joint venture
customers in the China’s auto industry. To judiciously interpret the econometric results,
these confounding factors need to be considered. Lastly, this section provides rich
description to show how selection and learning occur through interactions between

35
multinational buyers and local suppliers and sheds light on the understanding of the
productivity trajectory analyses in subsection 4.8.

5.1 A Simple Framework: What Generate the Observed Productivity
Externalities?
The conventional method to measure productivity is subject to measurement errors,
which may obscure true productivity externalities. It can be explained in the following
simple framework. Using the Cobb-Douglas production function,
(3)

In theory, output

should be firm-specific physical output, or the quantity of total

production; in data, we may observe firm-specific revenue (
Tybout 2009), or most of the time value added,

) (Katayama, Lu, and

.

Productivity is measured by using the production function on the logarithmic scale:
(4)

Value added is defined as:

Where

is the share of gross output accounted for by intermediate inputs, which is

defined as follows,
as metals and

,

is the price of individual intermediate inputs such

is the quantity of each intermediate input to produce one unit of final

product.
Rewrite output

. Plug this into production function (3) and rearrange it as:
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So, true productivity on the logarithmic scale is:
(5)

Compare equations (4) and (5), observed productivity is true productivity plus a
price-cost term:

Note that we often lack of price and cost information.
Higher

means that output is greater with the same equipment and labor, or even

less workers. Productivity may be raised by optimizing operating procedure, introducing
incentive payment plan, and so on. These can be accomplished through knowledge
transfer from external aids or by suppliers’ own efforts. In reduced form estimation, these
two distinctive sources of productivity enhancement are hardly distinguishable.
When

decreases, true productivity is underestimated. Price reduction due to market

competition or pressure from downstream customers would make the estimated
productivity lower than it should be. When

decreases, measured productivity is

greater than true productivity. Cost reduction due to management decision outside of the
production process may reflect in elevated TFP. Thus, true productivity is hard to
estimate without knowledge of price and cost; furthermore, direction of bias is still
unknown if we don’t know whether cost or price reduction weighs heavier.
This framework shows that besides knowledge transfer from foreign customers, there
are at least three factors influencing the observed productivity externalities: internal
efforts, price and cost factors. The following subsections present the case evidence to
demonstrate the presence of these factors in the China’s auto industry, which might
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confound the interpretation of the substantial productivity externalities through backward
linkages, which are found in the econometric analyses.

5.2 Case I: Knowledge Transfer before Selling to Downstream Foreign
Customers in the Light of the Bidding Process
By describing joint venture automaker B’s component localization process and its
bidding process, the following two points are highlighted. First, the need to save costs
and pressure from the Chinese partner of the joint ventures led to the joint venture
automakers’ decision to localize certain auto component and parts. To build up a local
supply base in the localization process quickly, foreign investors are called to transfer
technical knowledge and management practice to their supplier in various forms. Second,
in some cases, the bidding process is more than a means for joint venture automakers to
select qualified local suppliers; it also provides an inducement mechanism that stimulates
suppliers’ internal efforts.
Automotive manufacturing company B is a joint venture founded by a multinational
automotive corporation in German and a Chinese state-owned automaker. As one of the
largest joint venture manufacturers in China’s passenger market, Automaker B assembles
and manufactures in China its parent multinational’s brands, which enjoy a reputation for
high quality and popularity. As a late entrant, automaker B did not have to develop its
supply base from scratch, but instead was able to take advantage of a rather mature local
supply network, a fruit of its predecessors.
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Foreign Investors’ Incentives to Transfer Knowledge
Automaker B takes quality as its first priority and instills this value to its Chinese
partners and local Chinese suppliers. However, fierce market competition has been
pushing automaker B to strike a balance between the cost and quality of its components.
Automaker B’s long-term approach to maintaining its market competitiveness is to
localize some of its auto parts and components. Components incurring high shipping
costs are the first batch to be localized, which includes the following: 1) bulky,
lightweight items—for instance, bumpers and the body in white19; 2) fragile components,
such as safety glass; and 3) components which are easily deformed or damaged on the
way of shipping, such as tubing, A & B pillars20, pipelines, and exterior pieces. Because
they were fostered by automaker B, some local suppliers of these sorts of intermediate
products grow to be competent enough to be included in the global procurement system
of automaker B’s parent multinational company. Large oversea orders could bring prices
further down through economies of scale, which in return lowers automaker B’s input
price.21

19

Body in white, or BIW, refers to the stage in automotive design or automobile manufacturing in which a
car body's sheet metal components have been welded together — but before moving parts (doors, hoods,
and deck lids as well as fenders) the motor, chassis sub-assemblies, or trim (glass, seats, upholstery,
electronics, and so forth) have been added and before painting (Free Dictionary, s.v. "body in white"
[accessed March 8, 2015, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Body+in+white]).
20

Pillars are the vertical or near vertical supports of an automobile's window area or greenhouse—designat
ed respectively as the A, B, C or D-pillar moving in profile view from the front to rear. The A pillar is the f
rame of the front windshield that is between the windshield and the front doors. All cars with a windshield
come with an A pillar. The B pillars are located behind the front doors. It is the frame between the front and
rear doors (Wikipedia, s.v. "pillar (automobile)" [accessed March 8, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pill
ar_(automobile)]).
21

The interviewee in automaker B demonstrated this with an example. Company F, a Chinese automobile
safety glass manufacturer, successfully became the global supplier of automaker B’s parent multinational
company through partnership with automaker B.

39
Local procurement of certain auto parts is also in line with automaker B’s automotive
sequencing requirements.22 Automotive sequencing allows suppliers to deliver parts to
the manufacturers' production line in the proper build sequence right in time as scheduled
before they get assembled. It optimizes production efficiency while also reducing waste
and parts storage space. Frequent coordination is required between the manufacturing line
and the process area for adjustments and transportation. Components easily subject to
sequencing include doors, seats, wheels, glass, and bumpers. Sequencing calls for
suppliers’ strong commitment to a long-term partnership with their customers. In order to
meet pending sequencing requirements, suppliers need to increase investments in
sequencing and the ability to locate where parts are to ensure timely delivery. In most
cases, suppliers have to build up new production facility adjacent to23 their customer’s
manufacturing complex.
Another force behind automaker B’s component localization process is the Chinese
parent company and China’s local content requirements. Although since the July of 2008
the Local Content Requirement has become ineffective,24 the provisions of the policy that
require automobile producers to engage in a certain level of domestic parts production
continue to be in effect (Stewart et al. 2012, 19-21). Parent companies of Chinese and
foreign sides constantly negotiate over automaker B’s localization agenda.

22

As Sturgeon, Biesebroeck, and Gereffi (2008) points out, lead firms in the automotive industry have the
power to drive supplier co-location at the local levels for operational reasons, such as just-in-time
production and design collaboration.
23
24

In supplier M’s case, it is 34.2 km away from automaker B’s production base.

The local content requirement had been effective until the July of 2008, when WTO had issued a
decision that China had illegally imposed discriminatory tariffs on imported auto parts. (Bloomberg News
2008)
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Automaker B represents many other joint venture automakers in China which are
faced with both internal needs and external pressures to localize some of their
components and parts. These firms use knowledge transfer to build up local supply bases
in a rather short period of time. Below, the example of automaker B and its suppliers are
used to describe the bidding process, through which this joint venture automaker transfers
knowledge to local suppliers as to raise their productivity substantially and to improve
product quality.
A Brief Description of the Bidding Process
Once automaker B decides to replace an imported component with a local substitute,
it will select a few local producers of the component and invite them to submit bids. The
bidding process is organized by a team, with members from the Department of
Purchasing, the Department of Product Design, and the Department of R&D. Automaker
B usually does not invite many bidders in order to save on cost, because bidding is a
complicated review process, demanding a great deal of time and money from both
automaker B and its potential suppliers. In some cases, when there is only one qualified
local supplier, automaker B sends an invitation only to this supplier in addition to its
foreign parent company’s global supplier. The global supplier is more reliable in product
quality and has established channels for cooperation; however, unless it already has
production facility or is willing to set up new factory in China, automaker B will have to
rely on imports from this global supplier. After potential suppliers submit their bids, the
team evaluates their performance according to a grading system. The one with highest
score wins the contract.
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The bidding process not only guarantees what joint venture automakers eventually
select is the most competent supplier on the upstream market, it is also an interactive
learning experience for potential suppliers. In the process of preparing bidding documents,
suppliers are constantly pushed to their limits and thus improve themselves to meet
automaker B’s standards. Even though they may fail in their bid to automaker B, some
suppliers are still able to win another company’s bid, which they would have never won
if they had not prepared bids for automaker B’s purchasing contracts. To ensure product
quality, automaker B not only requires a finished component to meet certain standards,
but the whole production process must pass Process Auditing as well. Each production
step is reviewed, from purchasing proper materials, operating machinery, to organizing
final products, and successfully delivering in certain sequence on time, and so on.
Additionally, automaker B reviews its suppliers at each tier of supply chain in order to
ensure its quality.25 To this end, automaker B diffuses technical knowledge and
management knowhow and spends tremendous amounts of resources, time, and money.

25

For example, automaker B purchases car doors from a local supplier; however, it requires the door lock
switch to be imported from a B’s designated German supplier, because locally-produced switches failed to
meet B’s quality standards.
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Various Forms of Knowledge Transfer before Actual Production Begins
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Figure 4: Joint Venture Automaker B and Its Local Suppliers
Knowledge transfer takes place in various forms before actual production begins.
Some are identified in interviews with automaker B’s suppliers (see Figure 4). First,
technical knowledge is embedded in product design provided by foreign investors.
Supplier J, automaker B’s car seat and interior supplier for some car models, is barely
involved in designing car seats or interiors, but automaker B provides the blueprints that
were once used for outdated car models directly. Second, foreign investors help their
local suppliers identify second-tier suppliers of critical input materials. Supplier L is
automaker B's supplier of plastic pieces of cover plate. Supplier L was required to import
the same plastic material from the second-tier material supplier that used to sell to the
original plastic plate supplier of automaker B’s foreign parent company. Automaker B
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assisted in locating this plastic material supplier in Germany.26 In some cases, joint
venture automakers send a task force team to its suppliers’ plants to assist them to build
up production capacity. The third form of knowledge transfer, the direct on-site
assistance, differs from above two cases in its importance in improving suppliers’
productivity and product quality, as well as forging a long-term strategic supply
relationship. Below, the example of automaker B’s bumper supplier is delineated. Direct
on-site assistance not only involves significant amount of knowledge diffusion, but also
expedites knowledge adoption in local suppliers.
While automaker B was looking for a bumper supplier that would commit to a long
term strategic partnership, supplier M stood out in the bidding process as a competent
bumper supplier,27 although it initially fell short of automaker B’s standards. One
particular challenge company M faced early on was that its traditional coating technology
could no longer meet the European VOC emission requirements with which automaker B
had been complying. Supplier M was forced to abandon the traditional solvent-borne
coatings for waterborne coating technology. From 2007 to 2009, automaker B sent a task

26

Automaker B's assistance proved to be helpful but far from sufficient. The journey to identify this
German material supplier was rather painstaking. As supplier L's project manager vividly recalled,
automaker B only provided contact information of its German plastic plate supplier, which is supplier L's
potential competitor, but was reluctant to offer further help to get L in touch with the material supplier in
Germany. Supplier L had to make its own effort by asking this competitor directly. The not very friendly
plastic plate supplier charged 50 euro for a PPAP document, which had already been paid by Daimler and
presumably should not have been charged. Supplier L turned to automaker B’s Chinese parent company for
help, which had no upper hand over the issue. To its disappointment, company L had to pay for the
document itself and finally identified the German material supplier.
27

Supplier M is a subsidiary of a Mould and Plastic Technology Company, which boasts the largest
bumper producer in the local market, with annual production of 1,600,000 sets of bumpers. As early as
1998, this company had become Shanghai Volkswagen Santana’s exclusive bumper producer. Over years,
it has established its reputation and has a partnership with many prominent brands, like Buick and BMW.
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force team28 from Germany to supplier M to set up its production facility. In the
interviewee’s words, a project manager and a specialist on coloring flew from Germany
and “lived” at supplier M for over a year. Together with M’s own engineers, they had
successfully developed eleven colors for various car models. In addition, automaker B
introduced to company M an up-to-date punching and piercing welding machine. As
described by the M’s project manager, the traditional way to install radar on a bumper is
to punch and pierce the bumper first, and then to move it to the welding machine where
the radar is welded onto the bumper. This way often results in a coarse edge and low
accuracy. To achieve better accuracy, automaker B required supplier M to use the
punching and piercing welding machine, which incorporates several additional steps.
Another major improvement took place in the delivery system, as indicated by the
project manager. In the past, the degree of standardization and automation in logistics
management had fallen behind common practice. Purchase orders were sent by fax one
week earlier; the variety and amount of demand was rather limited, about 50 sets of
bumpers per day, so it was comparably straightforward to manually manage orders.
When supplier M became automaker B’s supplier in 2007, demand increased and became
more complicated (30 designs with 40 sets of each design), making it impossible to
manage manually. Like other carmakers, automaker B desired to cut back its inventory
costs, thus requiring supplier M to provide just-in-time delivery―reliably getting

28

As indicated by the project manager, automaker B bore the cost of hiring the task force team. Daily wage
of one expert is 900 euro; traveling and moving allowance are included as well. The cost of the whole team
could easily amount to a million euros. Automaker B also shared part of the upfront cost; in return, it owns
property rights to certain, if not all, technologies developed throughout this period.
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products there just before the customer needs them. With orders being placed every four
minutes through internet, supplier M had to turn to computerized order management.
Does Knowledge Transfer Translate into Productivity Growth or Quality
Improvement?
The first two forms of knowledge transfer, knowledge embedded in product design
and assistance with locating material suppliers, do not necessarily translate into
productivity growth or product quality improvement. If automaker B had not provided
supplier J with product blueprints, supplier J, as a leading car seat and interior supplier in
the market, would still have the R&D capability to develop new designs or localize
automaker B's existing designs. As for Supplier L, it was just a matter of time to locate its
German material supplier. By contrast, in spite of lacking a concrete measure of
productivity or quality, the project manager in supplier M pointed out that the direct
assistance from automaker B eventually materialized into an elevated unit price. In the
past, supplier M only focused on primary processing, that is, injection molding and
painting. Because the primary processing market is competitive, the price remained at a
rather low level. Supplier M used to sell bumpers at a unit price of RMB 150. After
working with automaker B, supplier M's bumpers were embedded with state-of-the-art
waterborne coating technology and with higher accuracy in welding. In addition, supplier
M's value chain was extended by adding the assembly service and just-in-sequence (JIS)
process.29 The unit prices of bumpers sold to automaker B ranged from RMB 1000 to

29

Just in sequence (JIS) is an inventory strategy that matches just in time (JIT) and complete fit in sequence
with variation of assembly line production. Components and parts arrive at a production line right in time a
s scheduled before they get assembled. Feedback from the manufacturing line is used to coordinate transpor
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2500. Reluctant to provide specific profit data, the project manager admitted that profits
of bumpers increase eventually, but with diminishing profit margins.

5.3 Case II: Knowledge Transfer through Interaction with Downstream
Foreign Customers after Actual Production Begins
Company D is a Chinese joint venture with an American automotive air-conditioning
system producer. In spite of being a supplier itself, company D’s interactions with its
local second-tier suppliers resemble those between automaker B and its first-tier suppliers.
They both select some local suppliers as their long-term strategic suppliers and designate
a Supplier Development Engineer team (called SDE) which specializes in assisting these
suppliers to improve continuously their productivity and to reduce costs. The case of
company D and its supplier S provide a rich description of various forms of knowledge
transfer after actual production begins.

tation to and from the process area. JIS is mainly implemented with automobile manufacturing (Free Dictio
nary, s.v. "just in sequence" [accessed March 8, 2015, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Just+in+S
equence]).
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Forms of Knowledge Transfers after Actual Production Begins
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Figure 5: Joint Venture D and its Local Supplier S
Based on a document provided by the SDE in company D on Supplier Continuous
Improvement and Lean Production, various forms of technology transfers from company
D to their local suppliers30 are summarized in Figure 6.
First, knowledge is directly transferred from company D to its suppliers through a
training and supplier visit. During the supplier visit, the SDE team reviews the ongoing
improvement projects with its supplier, makes sure the projects are being successfully
implemented, and identifies potential improvement opportunities. Once in a while,
suppliers are required to participate in training programs offered by the SDE team either
at company D or at the suppliers’ production sites. Training covers topics on EHS,31

30

These forms of knowledge transfer are also mentioned by interviewees at automaker B, but not in an
exhaustive manner.
31

Environment, Health and Safety. EHS are guidelines created by the International Finance Corporation.
company D is subject to EHS regulations and requires its suppliers to follow as well.
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QRQC,32 communication skills, and workshop visits are also included. The total training
hours of suppliers amounted to 658 hours in 2011.
Data Collection
and Analysis
week 4

Long-term
Planning
1-5 years

Annual
Planning
the first year

Trainning
week 4

Supplier
Visit
weeks 2-3

Monthly
Planning
weeks 1-2

Figure 6: Company D’s Standard Operating Mode of Supplier Continuous Improvement
(Source: Company D’s report)
Second, company D provides various incentives to elicit its suppliers’ internal effort
to constantly seek cost-saving and productivity-improving solutions. In the beginning of
each year, SDE sets a monetary goal for cost reduction,33 which is to be achieved by joint
efforts of all strategic suppliers. For instance, six suppliers were expected to reduce cost
by RMB 2,050 thousand in 2011. These suppliers were to come up with their own
projects under the guidance of company D. At the end of the year, SDE ranked each
32
33

Quick Response Quality Control.

Not all projects aim to reduce costs, but some improvement projects focus on quality improvement. For
example, out of 28 projects carried out in supplier S in 2011, 18 ended up with cost reduction.
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supplier’s performance by their completion of a costing saving goal. The best suppliers
were given the “Excellent Supplier” award. In addition, SDE encourages suppliers to
submit Kaizen cases to Kaizen Expo 2011, a nationwide competition for best production
process improvement. Company D and one of its suppliers S won prizes.
Third, interactions between company D and its suppliers are more than merely oneway knowledge diffusion. Instead, several information-sharing mechanisms are provided
by company D to expedite learning among suppliers and to generate knowledge on
performance improvement. Once a month, SDE releases a report including updates of
ongoing improvement projects and summary statistics of cost reduction. The monthly
report is circulated among all suppliers. The year-end supplier conference offers suppliers
and company D with opportunities to share successful experiences in a more interactive
way.

Does Knowledge Transfer Translate into Increased Productivity?
As company D’s strategic supplier, supplier S, a valves producer for automobile air
conditioning systems, receives company D’s assistance in many forms, as mentioned
above. Supplier S’s award-winning Kaizen case provides a glimpse of the dynamics of
productivity improvements unfolding in the production of product A. An English
translation of this Kaizan case is provided in Appendix B with an elaborate description of
efficiency improvement with some technical details.
Supplier S used to produce product A at an average rate of 12 seconds. Facing a
demand surge for product A, supplier S’s production capacity could no longer keep pace
with the demand. Increased demand required supplier S to improve its production
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capacity by reducing the cycle time to below 8 seconds. Supplier S’s Kaizen team began
by investigating each of the work stations along the production line and identified seven
bottleneck stations whose cycle times were above 8 seconds and thus needed adjustment.
Then the team measured productive time and idle time at some bottleneck stations and
computed efficiency as a ratio of productive time to total time. The efficiency measure of
both worker and machine turned out to be too low and thus had much room to improve.
The worker efficiency was between 59 percent and 68 percent, which meant that workers
remained idling at these bottleneck stations for at least one third of an entire production
cycle. The machine efficiency was even lower at some stations.
The Kaizen team came up with the following straightforward solutions. First, three
pairs of working stations were combined with proper rearrangements. As a result, the
cycle time at these combined stations was reduced to between 6.47 and 7.56 seconds, and
several operative positions were removed from the production line. In addition, each
working station was equipped with hydraulic trolleys with a height-adjustable flat panel,
facilitating operatives to stack and transport turnover boxes after each procedure,
reducing 3 seconds on average by eliminating an inefficient walking around and bending
movement. Overall, the cycle time after improvement was reduced to 7.56 seconds,
below the required level. Capacity of the production line increased from 4,200 units per
day to 6,300 units; and six working positions were removed from the line, yielding
annual cost savings of RMB 240 thousand. Similar adjustments were adopted in other
two production lines, raising production capacity by 50 percent.
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5.4 Is Knowledge Transfer Also Knowledge Spillover?
While multinational affiliates may have incentives to transfer knowledge to their local
suppliers, as this enables them to buy high-quality inputs from them, it is not clear that
multinational affiliates will provide the knowledge free of charge. Knowledge spillovers
arise only when there is a net benefit associated with knowledge transfer. Making a
conceptual distinction between knowledge transfer and knowledge spillover is crucial for
assessing the case for economic policy intervention. As pointed out by Smeets (2008),
whereas the existence of knowledge spillovers clearly warrants intervention, the
existence of knowledge transfer, which often takes place through market transaction,
does not necessarily do so. However, empirical work too often ignores this important
distinction. Due to the lack of information on the cost of knowledge transfer or learning,
many of the estimated effects are more likely related to knowledge transfer than
knowledge spillover. Keller (2010) highlights a dilemma that the more clearly
identifiable the recipient of the multinational's knowledge transfer is, the less likely it is
that any productivity effect is due to externalities or knowledge spillover.
Although data on the contractual payment for the knowledge transfer is rarely
available, and thus it is hard to subtract the cost from the supplier’s revenues before
computing total factor productivity, the cost of knowledge transfer can be substantial.
Interviews with company D and automaker B reveal that they constantly require their
suppliers to reduce price over time34. In fact, it is written in the purchasing contract that

34

Similarly, (B. Javorcik, Wolfgang, and Tybout 2008) also reports that the foreign investor, Wal-Mart in
their case study, demands annual price reductions from its local suppliers in Mexico.
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suppliers should commit to annual price reduction ranging from 3% to 5%. Not leaving
their suppliers alone, as in the example of company D, it assists their suppliers in seeking
cost-saving solutions, and the lower cost is further reflected in reduced intermediate
product prices. If the local supplier agrees to reduce prices which it charges automakers,
this suggests that the knowledge is actually costly to the local suppliers. To examine a net
benefit associated with knowledge transfer, the extent of intermediate price reduction
needs to be taken into account.

5.5 Other Sources of the Observed Productivity Externalities
As demonstrated in subsection 5.1, the observed productivity externalities associated
with backward linkages with foreign customers are not necessarily the true productivity
externalities. Two factors may also influence the observed productivity. One is suppliers’
own effort to improve productivity independent of their foreign customers’ assistance;
the other is the reductions of price and cost of intermediate products sold to foreign
customers. Case evidence reveals that both are possible in the China’s auto sectors.
Internal Learning Independent of Foreign Customers’ Assistance
Although suppliers may receive tremendous technical supports from their customers,
suppliers are striving on their own efforts to constantly improve productivity. As
mentioned earlier, automaker B’s task force team assisted its supplier M to develop the
state-of-are waterborne coating technology, which is the key to supplier M’s success.
Nevertheless, facing fierce market competition, supplier M is motivated to continuously
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seek cost-saving and productivity-improving solutions. Introduction of incentive payment
plan is one of such endeavors.
In the past, M’s workers were paid hourly, giving them every reason to shirk. Now,
workers are grouped into teams and compensated financially for the goals they meet as a
collective group. The smaller a team is, the higher salary each team member receives.
Thus workers have incentive to share more responsibility by reducing team size. Another
benefit is that assignment of working loads is decentralized to a team. Within a team,
working loads differ according to their position. Instead of assigning different salary,
team members reach an agreement as how to rotate. With team-based incentive payment
plan, three shifts of workers are reduced to two; and every production line almost triples
its quantity, from 60 to 170.
Price and Average Cost Reduction of Auto Components
Both company D and automaker B indicate that they constantly require their local
suppliers to reduce price over time. Similarly, Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2011) finds
that “price levels fell significantly in sectors where foreign firms exerted a significant
downward pressure via backward linkages”. Therefore, the estimated backward spillover
effect may be underestimated if the input price reduction induced by downstream foreign
firms is not taken into account.
Company D also provides an example of management decisions to reduce cost but
not of technological learning that would easily show up in a production function. It shows
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how readjustment of delivery methods saves one third of transportation cost.35 First,
ground transport of cargo was replaced by marine shipping, reducing the transportation
cost up to RMB 1.78 million; second, rearrangements of items in the cargo brought down
cost by RMB 1.05 million; third, capacity of each box was enlarged by repositioning
items, reducing cost from RMB 2.19 to 1 per item. These management decisions outside
of the actual production process can reduce the final unit cost of production. This could in
principle be translated into a production function framework as the management decision
would reduce the intermediate costs of production and thus increase value added for the
firm. This would show up as an increase in TFP. But the true productivity does not
increase accordingly, because these management decisions have no direct impact on its
production process.
Therefore, in the production function estimation with the conventional measure of
TFP, when we observe suppliers’ measured TFP increase associated with connection with
foreign customers, it may not always attribute to backward linkage spillovers.

5.6 A Discussion of the Econometric Results in the Light of Case Evidence
Automaker B’s example has identified an important feature about product launch in
joint venture automaker’s local suppliers―a one to two years’ time lag between the
procurement contract and the actual production―which is hardly observable in the data.
During this period of time, automakers and their suppliers interact to various degrees;
sometimes substantial knowledge diffusion and absorption takes place. After being

35

More details are provided in Appendix C.
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selected as automaker B’s supplier, it took supplier L more than one year to get its
production line running. Another supplier, company M, spent almost two years to set up
an entire operation process that met automaker B’s requirements.
This time lag is also reflected in the literature. For instance, Kim (1997) finds there
are long lags between technology transfer and successful production. Moreover, Pack
(2013) highlights the fact that the interaction of transfer and internal effort during the
preparation period is a very important component of the benefits from technology transfer
and calls for case studies to focus on such interactions. Thus, understanding this one to
two years’ time lag is important in order to interpret the econometric findings judiciously.
First, the coefficients on the entrance leads (Table 8) are significantly positive, which
seems to imply that foreign brands tend to select more productive suppliers of domestic
brands. However, given the fact that supplier firms’ interactions with their joint venture
automakers begin two years before actual production, the purchase order provided an
inducement mechanism that stimulates suppliers’ internal effort in learning with
automakers’ external assistance. While it is not an easy task to disentangle the learning
effect from selection, the impact of intensive learning occurring before actual production
should not be disregarded. A similar inducement mechanism is highlighted in Pack (2013)
when discussing the export-productivity link.
Second, some auto parts suppliers are founded for the exact reason to supply
particular joint venture automakers; for example, supplier M was established to serve the
purpose of joint venture automaker B, and thus had received technical assistance from B.
However, the productivity data of these suppliers become available only after the actual
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production begins, so the productivity growth associated with intensive learning during
this project preparation period fails to be captured in the econometric analysis. For that
reason, the aggregate productivity-enhancing effect of knowledge transfer from joint
venture automakers tends to be underestimated.

6

Concluding Remarks
Previous studies find strong evidence for prominent productivity externalities through

backward linkages from downstream foreign firms to upstream suppliers. This study
confirms these findings by using a unique dataset from the Chinese automotive industry.
This dataset can identify individual firms as suppliers to multinationals and thus a set of
direct supply linkage measures are constructed accordingly. This is in contrast to the
industry-level linkage measures used in earlier studies, which rely on input-output
matrices and can only measure interactions between sectors. Compared with suppliers
that only sell to domestic brands, the total factor productivity premium is about 16.7
percent for auto parts suppliers that sell to at least one foreign brand. Furthermore, by
employing a difference-in-differences estimation, this study shows that auto parts
suppliers’ productivity grows by 25.5 percent in the first year after forging partnerships
with foreign brands and continues to grow in the following few years.
While the econometric results do not suggest any particular source of the observed
productivity externalities through backward linkages, the subsequent case study identifies
knowledge transfer from multinationals to local suppliers as an important source of
productivity gains. Interviews with a joint venture automotive producer and several local
automotive component suppliers in China revealed two key findings: first, joint venture
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automakers have incentives to transfer technical knowledge and management practice to
some of their suppliers in various forms, and second, this transferred knowledge can
translate into suppliers’ enhanced productivity, quality improvement, and cost reduction.
The case study also identified three caveats that researchers should consider when
interpreting the prevalent productivity externalities through backward linkages in the
econometric analyses. First, joint venture customers transfer knowledge to some of their
suppliers to improve their productivity. In return, these suppliers charge their joint
venture customer lower prices. Thus, the knowledge is not necessarily free, and therefore
knowledge transfer may not be an externality.
Second, the case study also finds several other sources of observed productivity
externalities related to backward linkages, which, unlike knowledge spillovers, are not
necessarily true externalities. One is suppliers' internal efforts independent of foreign
automakers' assistance, but concurs with knowledge spillovers from foreign automakers.
The other two are the reduction of price and cost of intermediate products sold to foreign
customers. While price reduction may underestimate true productivity externalities, cost
reduction would overestimate them. Direction of bias depends on whether cost or price
reduction weighs more heavily.
Third, an important feature about product launch in joint venture automakers’ local
suppliers―a one to two year lag between the procurement contract and the actual
production―is identified in the case study. During this period, substantial knowledge
diffusion and absorption can take place. While the productivity data of these suppliers
become available only after the actual production begins, the productivity growth
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associated with intensive learning during this preparation period fails to be captured in
the econometric analysis. For that reason, the aggregate productivity-enhancing effect of
supplying joint venture automakers tends to be underestimated. Without a better
understanding of these caveats, it will be difficult to assess the case for economic policy
intervention.
Certainly, we need more research to fully understand the sources of the observed
productivity externalities generated through backward linkages with multinationals and to
identify the true productivity externalities of FDI. Specifically, it would be helpful to
obtain the price and cost information of intermediate products sold to multinationals and
to explore how much price reduction is associated with knowledge transfers from these
multinationals. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate the birth of new firms in
response to multinationals' demands, which would be an important source of aggregate
productivity gains.
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Table 1: Local Content Ratea of Joint Venture: 1985-1997
1985

1991

Beijing Jeep (Beijing Cherokee)

0%

43.51%

Shanghai VW (Santana)

0%

60.09%

Guangzhou Peugeot (Peugeot 505)

0%

19.05%

First-Auto VW (Audi)

-

13.66%

Dongfeng-Citroen (Fukang/Citroen ZX)

-

-

a

85.82%

92.9%b
>80%

25%

60%

“Local content rate” officially refers to the percentage of a product that is

manufactured within all of China.
b

1994-1995 1996-1997

Thun(2006, Table 2.1)

Source: CAIY (multiple years).
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Table 2: The Production Function Estimations with Direct Backward Linkage Measures, Initial Estimates

Minimum linkage measure
of foreign brands
Minimum linkage measure
of JV automakers
Any of the two minimum
linkage measures
Log(capital)
Log(labor)

(1)

(2)

0.117
(0.0950)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.166*

0.108

0.0683

(0.0947)

(0.106)

(0.107)

0.0720

0.185**

0.0141

0.143*

(0.0695)

(0.0765)

(0.0719)

(0.0806)

(7)

(8)

0.105

0.195**

(0.0703) (0.0780)
0.405*** 0.399*** 0.408*** 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.398*** 0.408*** 0.400***
(0.0718) (0.0719) (0.0711) (0.0712) (0.0718) (0.0718) (0.0712) (0.0712)
0.544*** 0.492*** 0.541*** 0.488*** 0.544*** 0.489*** 0.541*** 0.488***
(0.112)
(0.121)
(0.111)
(0.120)
(0.112)
(0.120)
(0.111)
(0.120)

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Province time trends
F test (p-value)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
province trends = 0
R-squared
0.217
0.307
0.216
0.308
0.217
0.308
0.217
0.309
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. Minimum linkage measure equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least one
foreign brand or JV automaker in a given year and zero otherwise. N=2,985. OLS estimates given. Supplier firm fixedeffects, year dummy variables, and a constant included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level to
correct within-firm serial correlation.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Table 3: The Production Function Estimations with a Variety of Direct Backward Linkage Measures
Foreign Brands
(1)
(2)
(3)
Minimum linkage measure of
foreign brands

JV Automakers
(4)
(5)
(6)

0.166*
(0.0947)

Linkage intensity measure of
foreign brands

0.0500
(0.0317)

Indicator of selling to one foreign
brand

0.158*
(0.0952)

Indicator of selling to two
foreign brands

0.244**
(0.114)

Indicator of selling to three or
more foreign brands

0.199
(0.122)

Minimum linkage measure of JV
automakers

0.185**
(0.0765)

Linkage intensity measure of JV
automakers

0.0378
(0.0355)

Notes: Table continued in following page.

Tech. Licensing
(7)
(8)
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(continued from previous page)

Indicator of selling to one JV
automaker

0.188**
(0.0764)

Indicator of selling to two JV
automakers

0.154
(0.0973)

Indicator of selling to three or
more JV automakers

0.177
(0.113)

Minimum linkage measure of
technology licensing

-0.00234
(0.0539)

Any of the three minimum
linkage measures

0.0584
(0.0623)

R-squared
0.307
0.307
0.308
0.308
0.306
0.308
0.306
0.301
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least
one foreign brand or one JV automaker or under one technology licensing agreement in a given year and zero otherwise. The
linkage intensity measure is the total number of foreign brands or JV automakers a supplier sold to. N=2,985. OLS estimates
given. Supplier firm fixed-effects, year dummy variables, province specific time trends, and a constant included. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level to correct within-firm serial correlation. Omitted reference group in col.3
and col.6 are suppliers which sold only to domestic brands and domestic automakers respectively.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Table 4: The Production Function Estimations with Direct Backward Linkage
Measures, by Supplier Firms’ Ownership Type

Minimum linkage measure
of foreign brands

(1)
Domestic

(2)
Foreign

0.155

0.272

(0.100)

(0.193)

Minimum linkage measure
of JV automakers
Log(capital)
Log(labor)

0.328***
(0.0819)
0.405***
(0.136)

0.579***
(0.150)
0.278
(0.302)

(3)
Domestic

(4)
Foreign

0.114*

0.198

(0.0681)
0.332***
(0.0808)
0.400***
(0.135)

(0.202)
0.584***
(0.150)
0.276
(0.302)

Observations
1,647
810
1,647
810
R-squared
0.339
0.504
0.338
0.502
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. Column title ‘Domestic’ is short
for domestic supplier firms; ‘Foreign’ is for foreign-invested suppliers, also
including Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan-invested suppliers (HKMT). The
minimum linkage measure equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least one
foreign brand or JV automaker in a given year and zero otherwise. OLS estimates
given. Supplier firm fixed-effects, year dummy variables, province specific time
trends, and a constant included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
firm level to correct within-firm serial correlation.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Table 5: The Production Function Estimations with Backward Linkage Measures of
Foreign Brands, by Supplier Firms’ Age
Estimations by Age Groups
Old
Middle-Aged Young
Suppliers
Suppliers
Suppliers
Minimum linkage
measure of foreign
brands
Log(firm age)
Log(firm age)^2
Log(capital)
Log(labor)

0.186*
(0.101)
0.513***
(0.113)

0.182*

0.218

(0.101)
(0.140)
0.311
(0.196)
0.128
(0.112)
0.380*** 0.379*** 0.259***
(0.0736) (0.0727) (0.0797)
0.436*** 0.421*** 0.524***
(0.129)
(0.132)
(0.129)

0.115

0.227

(0.145)

(0.202)

0.525***
(0.127)
0.210
(0.248)

0.410***
(0.123)
0.542**
(0.235)

Observations
2,437
2,437
881
882
1,222
R-squared
0.342
0.343
0.448
0.370
0.402
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure of foreign
brands equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least one foreign brand and zero
otherwise. Firm age is calculated as one plus the number of years between the founding
year and the year of observation. Old suppliers are those established before 1970, the
middle-aged are between 1970 and 1995, and young suppliers are after 1995. 1970 and
1995 are the two cutoff points of firm age tertile. OLS estimates given. Supplier firm
fixed-effects, year dummy variables, province specific time trends, and a constant
included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level to correct withinfirm serial correlation.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Table 6: The Production Function Estimations with Backward Linkage Measures of
Foreign Brands, by Intermediate Product Category and Region
A. By Intermediate Product Category
Body and Interior
Chassis
Electrical and Electronics
(n=543)
(n=971)
(n=345)
0.0151
0.136
-0.0880
(0.158)
(0.119)
(0.302)
Engine components and
Miscellaneous auto parts
parts
(n=835)
(n=291)
0.124
0.162
(0.247)
(0.195)
B. By Region
East China
South China
Central China
(n=979)
(n=187)
(n=220)
-0.00549
-1.100***
0.187
(0.173)
(0.237)
(0.143)
North China
Northwest China
Southwest China
(n=543)
(n=72)
(n=345)
0.0176
0.181
(0.164)
(0.122)
Northeast China
(n=639)
0.526
(0.355)
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure of foreign
brands equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least one foreign brand and zero
otherwise. Each coefficient is from separate production function estimation. OLS
estimates given. Supplier firm fixed-effects, year dummy variables, province specific
time trends, and a constant included in all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the firm level to correct within-firm serial correlation.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Table 7: The Production Function Estimations with Backward Linkage Measures, Controlling for Agglomeration and
Competition Effects
(1)
Minimum linkage
measure of foreign
brands

Foreign Brands
(2)
(3)

(4)

0.220**

0.211**

0.207*

0.196

(0.107)

(0.107)

(0.107)

(0.125)

Minimum linkage
measure of JV
automakers
Log(capital)
Log(labor)
Localization
Urbanization
Competition
Linkage

Comp.

(5)

0.132*

0.358***
(0.0838)
0.566***
(0.132)

0.360***
0.368***
0.367***
(0.0831)
(0.0829)
(0.0831)
0.566***
0.566***
0.567***
(0.130)
(0.129)
(0.129)
-0.0288** -0.0408*** -0.0410***
(0.0118)
(0.0150)
(0.0151)
0.0178
0.0185
0.0186
(0.0159)
(0.0159)
(0.0158)
0.0491*
0.0446
(0.0276)
(0.0294)
0.0078
(0.0360)

JV Automakers
(6)
(7)

0.122*

0.128*

(8)

0.123

(0.0730) (0.0721)
(0.0717)
(0.0765)
0.362*** 0.363***
0.371***
0.371***
(0.0837) (0.0830)
(0.0827)
(0.0833)
0.565*** 0.564***
0.565***
0.566***
(0.132)
(0.130)
(0.129)
(0.129)
-0.0292** -0.0416*** -0.0418***
(0.0118)
(0.0149)
(0.0150)
0.0160
0.0168
0.0169
(0.0158)
(0.0159)
(0.0158)
0.0512*
0.0483*
(0.0273)
(0.0291)
0.0046
(0.0291)

R-squared
0.361
0.367
0.369
0.369
0.359
0.365
0.368
0.368
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure of foreign brands equals one if a supplier firm
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sold to at least one foreign brand and zero otherwise. N=1,902. OLS estimates given. Supplier firm fixed-effects, year dummy
variables, province specific time trends, and a constant included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
to correct within-firm serial correlation. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 8: The Production Function Estimations with Backward Linkage Measures with
Leads and Lags
New Suppliers to:
Foreign
JV
Brands
automakers
Leads and Lags of
becoming suppliers of
foreign brands or JV
automakers
Supply status changet+3
Supply status changet+2
Supply status changet+1
Supply status changet0
Supply status changet-1
Supply status changet-2
Supply status changet-3
forward

Domestic Suppliers to:
Domestic
Non-JV
Brands
automakers

0.0550
(0.165)
0.238
(0.162)
0.115
(0.165)
0.282*
(0.156)
0.458**
(0.217)
0.716***
(0.223)
0.636*

0.202
(0.160)
0.209
(0.131)
0.0793
(0.152)
0.325**
(0.147)
0.394*
(0.203)
0.532**
(0.218)
0.599

0.0835
(0.198)
0.155
(0.222)
0.0786
(0.195)
0.267
(0.177)
0.245
(0.317)
0.473
(0.315)
0.261

0.192
(0.160)
0.132
(0.202)
-0.0596
(0.187)
-0.00718
(0.185)
-0.127
(0.296)
-0.0180
(0.310)
-0.0784

(0.353)

(0.371)

(0.328)

(0.303)

F test (p-value)
Status
change(t0-t3
0.016
0.151
0.306
0.937
forward) = 0
Observations
1,441
1,223
715
611
R-squared
0.349
0.365
0.482
0.529
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure equals
one if a supplier firm sold to at least one foreign brand or JV automaker in a given year
and zero otherwise. New suppliers of foreign brands or JV automakers are those which
used to sell to domestic firms and only began to sell to foreign brands or JV automakers
during the period between 1998 and 2004. OLS estimates given. Supplier firm fixedeffects, year dummy variables, province specific time trends, and a constant included.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level to correct within-firm serial
correlation. Status changet-3 forward dummy is equal to one in every year beginning
with the third year after becoming suppliers of foreign brands or JV automakers.
Reference group is suppliers to only domestic brands between 1998 and 2004.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Appendix A
Table A. 1: Summary of Variables
Numeric Variables
Value added (1 million Yuan)
Employment (persons)
Asset (1 million Yuan)
Age (years)36
Linkage Measures
Minimum Linkage―Foreign Brands
Minimum Linkage―Joint Venture
Automaker
Minimum Linkage―Tech. Licensing
Linkage Intensity―Foreign Brands
Linkage Intensity ―Joint Venture
Automaker
Agglomeration Measures
Localization Economies
Urbanization Economies
Competition (the inverse of Herfindahl
Index)
Other Variables
Province
Zip code
Brand
Automaker

Foreign partner of brands

Foreign partner of automakers

36

# of Obs.
3282
3405
3401
2203
# of Obs.
3287

Mean
1509.0
738.6
11966.3
28.93
Mean
0.576

Std.Dev.
4380.9
1171.7
29349.5
17.02
Std.Dev.
0.494

3287

0.669

0.471

3287
3287

0.436
0.943

0.496
1.072

3287

0.916

0.857

# of Obs.
2174
2174

Mean
3.743
8.678

Std.Dev.
3.439
2.374

2174

1.118

1.695

Suppliers in the sample are from 27
provinces.
Suppliers are scattered in 676 zip-code
areas.
Suppliers in the sample sell to 98 foreign
and domestic auto brands, e.g., Buick, Alto.
Suppliers in the sample sell to 52
automakers, e.g., Shanghai VW, Tianjin
Toyota, Chery.
For all foreign brands, this variable
indicates their producers, e.g., Toyota, GM;
there are 15 foreign partners.
There are 17 foreign automakers in
corporation with Chinese assemblers.

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, many firms still “existed”, but closed for revolutionary
violent class struggle. Some firms closed forever; the other firms resumed operation after 1976. The “old”
firms in the data sample are those survived.
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Automobile parts
Categories of Automobile parts
Large categories of Automobile parts
Ownership

Suppliers in the sample produce 333 kinds
of automobile parts
The 333 different kinds of auto parts can be
grouped into 23 categories.
The 333 different kinds of auto parts can be
further grouped into 5 large categories.

71

Table A. 2: The Production Function Estimations with Backward Linkage Measures of
JV Automakers, by Supplier Firms’ Age
Estimations by Age Groups
Old
Middle-Aged Young
Suppliers
Suppliers
Suppliers
Minimum linkage
measure of JV
automakers
Log(firm age)

0.137*

0.133*

0.0743

0.177

0.337**

(0.0773)
0.517***
(0.113)

(0.0770)
0.312
(0.196)
0.130
(0.112)
0.383***
(0.0721)
0.418***
(0.131)

(0.0903)

(0.155)

(0.167)

0.281***
(0.0788)
0.511***
(0.129)

0.521***
(0.127)
0.211
(0.247)

0.409***
(0.122)
0.530**
(0.232)

Log(firm age)^2
Log(capital)
Log(labor)

0.384***
(0.0730)
0.433***
(0.128)

Observations
2,437
2,437
881
882
1,222
R-squared
0.341
0.342
0.444
0.371
0.405
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure of JV
automakers equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least one JV automaker and zero
otherwise. Firm age is calculated as one plus the number of years between the founding
year and the year of observation. Old suppliers are those established before 1970, the
middle-aged are between 1970 and 1995, and young suppliers are after 1995. 1970 and
1995 are the two cutoff points of firm age tertile. OLS estimates given. Supplier firm
fixed-effects, year dummy variables, province specific time trends, and a constant
included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level to correct withinfirm serial correlation.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
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Table A. 3: The Production Function Estimations with Backward Linkage Measures of
JV Automakers, by Intermediate Product Category and Region

Body and Interior
(n=543)
0.126
(0.172)
Engine components
and parts
(n=835)
0.252
(0.226)

A. By Intermediate Product Category
Chassis
Electrical and Electronics
(n=971)
(n=345)
0.179*
-0.0843
(0.0956)
(0.177)
Miscellaneous auto parts
(n=291)
0.241
(0.189)

B. By Region
East China
South China
Central China
(n=979)
(n=187)
(n=220)
0.0192
0.176
0.0365
(0.146)
(0.196)
(0.184)
North China
Northwest China
Southwest China
(n=543)
(n=72)
(n=345)
0.325*
0.142
0.179
(0.167)
(0.702)
(0.115)
Northeast China
(n=639)
0.263
(0.244)
Notes: Dependent variable: log value added. The minimum linkage measure of JV
automakers equals one if a supplier firm sold to at least one JV automaker and zero
otherwise. Each coefficient is from separate production function estimation. OLS
estimates given. Supplier firm fixed-effects, year dummy variables, province specific
time trends, and a constant included in all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the firm level to correct within-firm serial correlation.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.

73
Appendix B: Supplier S’s Case of Improving Production Capacity of Product A
(Below is an English translation of Supplier S’s award-winning Kaizan case proposal.)
Problem: As the demand for product A increased, production capacity then could no
longer keep pace with the demand. Increased demand requires the Takt Time (TT)37 to go
down from 12 seconds to 8, thus the cycle time (CT) needs to decrease accordingly from
11.5s to below 8.
Goal: Developing an effective standard operating procedure (SOP) for the production line
and bringing production’s cycle time under 8s.

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Cycle Times of Working Stations before the Change

Combine
Combine

Figure B. 1: Cycle Times of Working Stations before the Kaizan Improvement

37

Lean Production uses Takt Time as the rate that a completed product needs to be finished in order to
meet customer demand.
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Problem Analysis: The production line consists of twelve work stations. The Kaizen team
began by investigating each of the work stations and identified seven bottleneck stations,
whose CT were above 8 seconds. Cycle times of the twelve working stations are
displayed in the chart below. These above the red line are bottleneck stations and needed
adjustment.
At two bottleneck stations, Overall Compression and 0°C Test, the team measured
productive time and idle time, and computed efficiency as ratio of productive time to
total time.
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Overall Compression
worker

time

machine

install four valves

7.3s

idle

scan the next batch of
valves to be tested

9.7s
compression

wait

17s

remove
the
valves
from
machine

four
the

7.4s

idle

summary cycle

Idle time

Productive time

Efficiency

worker

41.4s

17s

24.4s

58.9%

machine

41.4s

14.7

26.7s

64.5%

Adjust and test actuation value at 0°C
worker

time

machine

install two valves

9.1s

idle

wait

7.4s

test

Under tooling

6.4s

idle

On tooling

9.1s

idle

wait

7.4s

test

6.4s

idle

remove
valves

the

two

summary cycle

Idle time

Productive time

Efficiency

worker

45.8s

14.8s

31s

67.7%

machine

45.8s

31s

14.8s

32.3%
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Notes: Grey areas are productive times.
Similarly, at working stations 10°C Test and Balance Detection, the team did the
same analysis.
Test actuation value at 10°C
worker

time

machine

install two valves

8.5s

idle

wait

5.6s

test

Under tooling

6.4s

idle

On tooling

9.1s

idle

wait

5.6s

test

9.2s

idle

remove
valves

the

two

summary cycle

Idle time

Productive time

Efficiency

worker

44.4s

11.2s

33.2s

74.8%

machine

44.4s

33.2s

11.2s

25.2%

Balance Detection
worker

time

machine

change valves

2.7s

idle

scan the next batch of
valves to be tested

3s

wait

3.9s

detection

summary cycle

Idle time

Productive time

Efficiency

worker

9.6s

3.9

5.7s

59.4%

machine

9.6s

2.7s

6.9s

71.9%

Notes: Grey areas are productive times.
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Statistics showed that efficiencies of both worker and machine were too low and had
big room to improve.
Solutions and Results:
1. Combine two working stations, Overall Compression and 0°C Test and add one
testing position; as a result, cycle time was reduced to 7.56 seconds and two
operative positions were removed. Similarly, working stations 10°C Test and
Balance Detection resulted in 7.25 seconds and saved two operative positions as
well. Below are pictures of rearranging two stations.

In addition,
2. Two working stations, Valve Port Extrusion and Installing Tablet and O-rings,
share similar pneumatic device. With fixture transformation and technical
parameter adjustment, one air pressure machine could do both jobs. Therefore,
cycle time after working station combination was reduced to 6.47 seconds, and

78
two operative positions were saved as well. Below are pictures showing how the
two stations were combined.

3. Introduce to each working station hydraulic trolley with height-adjustable flat
panel, which facilitates operatives to stack and transport turnover boxes after each
procedure, reducing 3 seconds on average due to inefficient walking around and
bending movement.

Overall, cycle time after improvement was reduced to 7.56 seconds, below TT of 8
seconds. Additionally, 6 working positions were removed, yielding annual cost savings of
240 thousand RMB.
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Cycle Times of Working Stations after the Change

Figure B. 2: Cycle Times of Working Stations after the Kaizan Improvement
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Appendix C: Company D’s Transportation Cost Reduction
(Below is an English translation of Company D’s award-winning Kaizan case proposal
of saving 1/3 of Transportation Cost)
Shanghai Delphi provides automotive air-conditioning systems for many Chinese
OEM38 customers; thus transportation cost accounts for most of the selling costs. To
maintain competitive cost structure, it is forced to reduce transportation cost and limit
price increases. The Lean Supply Chain team proposed three approaches.

First, ground transport of cargo was replaced by marine shipping, reducing the
transportation cost up to 1.78 million RMB.

38

Original Equipment Manufacture
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Second, rearrange items of different rate of weight to volume. Top left are light bulky
boxes which wasted plenty of space; bottom left are heavy bags. By stacking bulky boxes
on top of the heavy bags, the adjustment alone saves 1.05 million RMB.
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Third, increase capacity of each box by repositioning items as shown in pictures
below, reducing transportation cost from 2.19 RMB per item to 1 RMB, by 54%.
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Movie Piracy and Sales Displacement in Two Samples of
Chinese Consumers
(Article is co-authored with Joel Waldfogel)

1

Introduction
It is widely believed that intellectual property piracy is widespread in China and

elsewhere in Asia. This has caused great consternation among the countries exporting
commercial intellectual property, chiefly the U.S. Especially as it grows wealthy, China
could become an important export market for intellectual property. U.S. film studios in
particular are concerned about piracy. The Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) claims that its members lost $6.1 billion to piracy in 2005, $4.8 billion
internationally, and the MPAA estimates that 90 percent of movies sold in China are
pirated copies, stating that the “countries where movie piracy is occurring most
prominently are China, Russia, UK, France, Spain, Brazil, Italy, Poland and Mexico.”
The U.S. government shares Hollywood’s concern about piracy in China.39
Even if intellectual property piracy is widespread in China, it does not follow that
paid consumption would have been higher in the absence of unpaid pirate consumption.

39

“The Administration’s top priorities this year continue to be addressing weak IPR protection and
enforcement, particularly in China and Russia. Although this year’s Special 301 Report shows positive
progress in many countries, rampant counterfeiting and piracy problems have continued to plague China
and Russia, indicating a need for stronger IPR regimes and enforcement in those countries.” Under Special
301, the United States Trade Representative “must identify those countries that deny adequate and effective
protection for IPR or deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property
protection.” And: “China remains a top intellectual property enforcement and TRIPS compliance priority
for the United States. China will remain on the Priority Watch List, and remain subject to Section 306
monitoring.”
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The amount of paid activity that stealing displaces depends on both the volume of unpaid
activity and the rate of displacement of paid for unpaid consumption. A growing body of
literature provides estimates of displacement rates for a variety of media (music, movies,
video), and available evidence provides a range of displacement rates that vary across
media. The smallest displacement rates arise in television, where access to clips on
YouTube appears not to cannibalize conventional television viewing.40 Music provides
intermediate displacement estimates, with estimates around a quarter (although some as
low as zero).41 Estimates for movies provide the highest displacement rates: Rob and
Waldfogel (2007) find that unpaid movie consumption displaces paid consumption
roughly 1:1 in a sample of U.S. college students. They speculate that the high
displacement rate arises because movie consumption, even when unpaid, requires hours
of undivided attention.
The existing literature has focused largely on developed countries, particularly the
U.S. It is not clear whether findings in these contexts are relevant to China, a developing
country context with large-scale piracy. This paper seeks to answer that question with a
study of the effects of unpaid movie consumption on paid movie consumption among two
Chinese populations in 2009. First, we survey a sample of college students analogous to
the US student population examined in Rob and Waldfogel (2007, which we refer to as
RW below). Second, we survey a larger sample of Chinese Internet users.

40
41

See Waldfogel (2010).

See, for example, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), Rob and Waldfogel (2006), Liebowitz (2006),
Zentner (2006), and Hong (2007), among others.
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The paper proceeds in five sections following the introduction. Section two provides
background on the movie industry and piracy in China. Section three provides some
theoretical discussion on the effects of piracy on paid consumption. Section four
describes our two sources of data. Section five presents empirical results on the salesdisplacing effects of unpaid on paid consumption among our samples of Chinese
consumers. We speculate on the reasons for our small displacement estimates and
conclude in the last section.
We find large amounts of unpaid movie consumption in both of our samples: nearly
three quarters of movie consumption is unpaid, compared with under a tenth in a US
college-student sample. We find mixed but, at most, modest evidence of sales
displacement in China. Among the college students we find a statistically significant but
small rate of sales displacement. Longitudinal estimates suggest roughly 1:7
displacement, or that each instance of unpaid consumption reduces paid consumption by
a seventh. We find no evidence of sales displacement in the general online population
surveyed. Both estimates are far smaller than the comparable result for a US college
student sample, roughly 1:1 displacement.

2

Industry Background and Piracy Issue in China

The Chinese Movie Industry
Since 1949 China’s cultural market has been closed; for five decades the film
industry was financed, owned, and controlled by the government. Under government
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control, filmmakers were not burdened by the need to secure finance or recover
production costs at the box office. Since early 1992, as China has undergone economic
reform, the government-sanctioned film industry has faced competition from new sources
such as video parlors, Karaoke bars, and video piracy. Unable to withstand private
competition, the existing industry has withered, and filmmakers have turned to other
sources of finance. Privately – and jointly – owned production companies have
appeared.42
Since 1995, China has engaged in “box office split” (i.e. revenue-sharing) deals on up
to ten foreign films, usually ‘blockbusters’. Prior to 1995, foreign films were bought into
Chinese market for flat fees of $30,000 to $50,000 per film.43 These were typically
outdated and low-grade but inexpensive foreign movies.44 With China’s entry into the
WTO, the number of foreign films allowed in on a revenue-sharing basis rose from 10 to
20. This number is expected to increase to 40 in the coming years.45 Most of the foreign
films are Hollywood films, followed by films from Hong Kong. The effective quota need
not be filled if China determines that films have “improper content.”
In 2007, box office revenue in China totaled RMB 3.33 billion (approximately US
$438 million), or $0.35 per capita, while in the U.S. the box office revenue is $9.63

42

For detailed introduction of the history of the Chinese film industry, please refer to
www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/submissions/cfta_submission_6se05.pdf
43

The copyright is completely bought-out by the film distributor in China for a flat fee.

44

Supra note 4, page 10.

45

According to the 2008 Research Report on Chinese Film Industry, in 2007 10 films were actually
allowed into on a revenue-sharing basis, and 12 on a flat-fee basis; in 2006, 16 on a revenue-sharing basis,
and 13 the latter.
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billion, or $32 per capita.46 Although the scale of the Chinese film industry is rather
small compared with U.S., revenue is growing. The box office revenue in 2005 and 2006
totaled U.S. $250 million and U.S. $325 million respectively.47 In total, more than five
hundred domestic films were produced in 2007. Among 188 films released in theaters,
140 were domestic films, accounting for only 54.1 percent of total box office revenue; 48
foreign films earned the other 45.9 percent.48 In 2005, there were 1,216 theaters and
2,530 movie screens in China49, while U.S. had 6,114 cinema cites and 37,740 movie
screens.
Piracy in China
Piracy, both physical and on the Internet, is considered an important threat to the film
industry. According to some observers, no country contributes more to the piracy
problem, or will play a more critical role in shaping the future of international piracy,
than China (Priest, 2006). Physical piracy has flourished in China and has grown quickly
since the early nineties. According to industry estimates, more than 90 percent of all
music CDs, movies DVDs and software sold in China are pirated. In 2004, industry
estimates of U.S. losses due to piracy in China range from about $1.85 to $2.54 billion
annually in displaced sales of CDs, DVDs, VCDs and software.50

46

See http://www.natoonline.org

47

See http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS159860+28-Feb-2008+PRN20080228 (in Chinese)

48

See http://www.medialeader.com.cn/media/200806/20080624091808_19137.html (in Chinese)

49

See http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/whbg06/1120913.htm (in Chinese)

50

See footnote 5 of Priest (2006).
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Concern about Internet-based piracy has been heightened as China has grown to
account for the world’s second-highest number of Internet users. Thousands of websites
and numerous peer-to-peer file-sharing networks or FTP services make copyrighted
works available for free to Internet users in China.51 As in the U.S., use of these sites is
prominent on college campus, with a large proportion of low-income students and highspeed Internet access. While Chinese consumers do not have officially sanctioned access
to many foreign films, they are nevertheless able to view pirated versions online. Many
U.S. television programs, such as Prison Break and Lost, are not officially available in
China; but Chinese audiences are able to view episodes at the same time as U.S.
audiences through file-sharing networks.
While the West has blamed China’s central government for its failure to eliminate the
problem, the Chinese government believes it is not obligated to protect the interests of
private parties with the same urgency with which it protect its own interests. China has
employed gradual reforms, while performing occasional campaigns against infringers in
response to pressure from foreign and domestic copyright owners (Priest, 2006).
The Chinese government recently ordered a crackdown on online video and audio
content which does not have an individual license. Internet companies must edit or erase
such content.52 While the longer-term effects of the crackdown are not yet clear, a brief

51
52

See footnote 21 of Priest (2006).

See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2452e5a-1fa6-11de-a1df-00144feabdc0.html on the April 2009
crackdown.
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look at the most popular video-sharing websites, like Tudou.com and Youku.com, shows
that TV series such as X-Files, 24 hours, etc. had been removed.
Many foreign and domestic film companies have responded to China’s IP protection
climate with new business strategies. Recently, Warner Bros. announced an experimental
online service offering “DRM-protected copies of various Warner Bros. films (including
some that have never been released theatrically in China) for a fraction of the rental cost,
compared to other parts of the world…. The studio's movies will reportedly be available
for rent for a mere 4 to 7 yuan, roughly 60¢ to $1.03. … Warner Bros. is trying to
compete with street pirates who hawk burned movies on the cheap.”53 In music – and
also as a response to piracy - Google has made music available on a fully ad-supported
basis.54

3

Theory
The static effects of intellectual property piracy on both legal sales and welfare can be

described with a simple demand model (Figure 1). First consider a context in which the
product has a zero marginal cost and a positive price, but piracy is not possible. Then the
area under the demand curve is divided into revenue, consumer surplus, and deadweight
loss (Figure 1.1).

53

See
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/11/warner-bros-to-fight-china-movie-piracy-with-60downloads.ars
54

See Barboza, David. “Google and Music Labels Bet on Downloads in China.” New York Times, April 6,
2009.
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When piracy is feasible, the demand for legal products changes. However, the nature
of the change depends on whether the instances of demand manifesting themselves as
pirate consumption would otherwise have manifested themselves as legal purchases. For
example, if the low-valuation demanders – formerly resulting in deadweight loss – now
consume pirated products, then piracy raises welfare without reducing revenue (Figure
1.2). On the other hand, if consumers with high valuations of the product – who would
formerly have purchased legally – now consume pirated copies, then revenue falls
(Figure 1.3).
For the static problem, piracy increases welfare. Either valuations that were formerly
shared between consumer surplus and revenue now become simply consumer surplus. Or
(low) valuations that were formerly deadweight loss become consumer surplus.55
Piracy can, in principle, also stimulate the demand for paid consumption. Shapiro
and Varian (1999) emphasize the possible effect of sampling on paid demand. Bakos,
Brynjolffson, and Lichtman (1999) and Varian (2000) articulate theories in which filesharing does not necessarily reduce paid demand but may increase it, particularly if
sharing remains small in scale. Another consideration is that there are several sources to
generate revenue for movie industry, such as rentals, box office sales, royalties for
showing the movie on television, and DVD sales. Some consumers watch the same
movies several times. Therefore, it is possible that unpaid consumption may stimulate

55

A dynamic analysis – outside the scope of this study – would be different. If revenue does not cover the
cost of production, then the product won’t come into existence in the first place.

97
further paid consumption; on the contrary, an instance of unpaid consumption may
displace several instances of paid consumption as well (Rob and Waldfogel, 2007).
The key point that this analysis highlights, however, is that piracy can cause
anywhere between a 1:1 displacement of revenue and have no effect (and, possibly, even
a stimulating effect). Put another way, the effect of piracy is an empirical question that
we seek to address.

4

Data
The data for this study come from two surveys administered in China. The first

survey was administered to students at a Chinese university in late 2008. The second
survey was administered to a sample of Chinese Internet users in July 2009. We describe
these data sources in turn.
College Student Sample
The college student sample comes from a paper survey administered on the campus
of a Chinese university in December of 2008. The survey was given to 372 students in
two classes. The basic data set resulting from the survey is an individual-level panel on
legal and illegal movie consumption of movies released from 2006 to 2008.
In the survey, each student was shown lists of 50 movies from each of the past three
years for a total of 150 movies. For each movie, respondents were asked to indicate
whether they had seen it, whether they had seen it in paid or unpaid modes or both
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(theater, rented DVD, downloaded,…), and in what order they had viewed the films.56
For example, if they first saw the movie in a theater, then later watched a pirated DVD,
they would indicate “1” under theater and “2” under pirated DVD for that movie. The
list of 50 movies from each year included the 20 foreign movies allowed into China per
year, as well as 2057 domestic (Chinese) movies, and 10 additional foreign movies not
legally allowed in Chinese theaters, which we refer to as “unauthorized films” below.58
In addition to movie consumption, the survey asked the students to report their
interest in movies on a scale of 1 to 5 (whether their interest in movies was “a lot less”, “a
little less”, “about the same”, “a little more”, or “a lot more” than their peers) and to
indicate how often they go to a theater. The survey also asks about family income, gender,
age, and Internet access (over the past three years).
The first column of Table 1 summarizes the college student respondents’
characteristic data. Respondents average 20.2 years of age, and 50 percent are between
19.75 and 21. Just over half (52 percent) are female. Nineteen percent report annual
family income of less than $2,930, 32 percent report $2,930 to $7,320, 29 percent report
$7,320 to $14,640, $14,640 to $29,280, and 5 percent report a higher income.59 Only

56

Although respondents are presented a list of movies, rather than being asked to generate a list of movies
they have viewed, it remains possible that respondents will forget some of the movies the have seen.
57

In the 2006 sample, there are 19 foreign authorized films, 15 domestic movies and 16 unauthorized
movies; while in 2007, there are 21 foreign authorized films, 19 domestic films and 10 unauthozied.
58

A few unauthorized films are allowed into Chinese markets in the form of DVD, VCD, or even Blu-ray,
usually several months after theatrical release in China.
59

While these income levels seem low by developed country standards, it is important to keep in mind that
per-capita income in China was $4,620 in 2010 (see http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview).
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seven percent report below-typical levels of interest in movies, while 44 percent report
typical, 36 percent report more than typical, and 14 percent report far more than typical.
Over half (55 percent) report never going to the theater, while 39 percent report going
once a month or less, and 6 percent report going more often. High-speed Internet access
is nearly ubiquitous: 99 percent report having had it in 2008, 96 percent in 2007, and 80
percent in 2006.
Table 2 summarizes movie consumption among the college student respondents. As
the first (“all viewings”) column indicates, respondents had viewed movies among the
150 in the survey a total of 31 times. (These are listed as viewings rather than movies,
since some of the respondents view some of the movies multiple times.) Of these
viewings, three quarters (23 of 31) were unpaid. The vast majority of viewings – 96
percent – are first-time viewings. That is, these respondents do not typically see movies a
second or third time, while in the U.S. sample analyzed in RW, first viewings make up
only 78 percent.
The vast majority of the unpaid viewings are obtained via downloading; downloaded
movies make up three quarters of unpaid consumption and over half of consumption
overall. Theatrical consumption makes up a fifth of overall consumption and over 80
percent of legal consumption.
Internet User Sample
Our Internet user sample was collected through a major online paid survey
community in China. While our data license prevents us from disclosing the identity of
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the company (which we term “community C”), community C has one million registered
users. These users are compensated for survey participation, providing them with an
incentive to stay online and respond regularly to surveys. We posted our survey during a
two-week period in July of 2009 and obtained data on 3,852 individuals.
Our sample is fairly representative of the registered participants in community C.
According to company reports on community C, males account for 66 percent of
registered users and 63 percent of our sample. The majority of registered users – just
over 60 percent - at community C are between 18 and 30. A similar percentage of our
online sample falls into the same age range. Our Internet users are also at least roughly
representative of Chinese Internet users overall. According to a report issued by China
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), males accounted for 57 and 53 percent of
Internet users in 2007 and 2008, respectively, somewhat below their share in our sample
(63 percent). Our respondents are somewhat younger than typical Chinese Internet users;
nearly 90 percent of our respondents are between 20 and 40 years old, compared with just
over half of the Chinese Internet-connected population. Finally, our sample has a
somewhat higher income level than typical Internet users; nearly 60 percent of Internetconnected individuals have a lower monthly income (below $220), compared with only
15 percent of our online sample.
While our student sample covers respondents in a narrow age range, our Internet user
sample covers a much wider range. Half of our online survey respondents are between
25 and 33 (compared with an inter-quartile range of 19.8-21 for the students).
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Because college students may report either their own or their parents’ incomes as
“family income”, it is difficult to compare their reported income with the reported income
of the Internet user sample. Nevertheless, as Table 1 shows, the distribution of income is
fairly similar between our two populations.
Compared to the student sample, the online sample is less likely to have broadband.
While nearly all of the students (99 percent) had broadband in 2008, only 87 percent of
the online sample had broadband in 2008. Of the online population, 82 percent report
owning a DVD burner, compared with 64 percent of the students. Reported interest in
movies is higher in the online sample than among the students; 78 percent report aboveaverage interest in movies, compared with 49 percent among students. Finally, online
respondents report going to the theater more frequently; nearly half report going to
theaters more than twice a month, compared with only 6 percent of the students.
Paid and unpaid movie consumption is broadly similar for our college students and
online samples, and both differ substantially from the US college students in RW. While
our college student respondents had an average (median) of 8 (5) movie viewings by paid
means and 23 (18) by unpaid means, our online respondents had an average of 12 paid
viewings among an average of 33 overall viewings. Unpaid viewings make up the
majority of movie viewings among both populations. This is starkly at odds with survey
results based on US college students in Rob and Waldfogel (2007). First, US college
students watch far more movies than Chinese students. Given a list of 150 movies – the
top 50 in each of the preceding three years – respondents had viewed movies 57 times.
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Second, the vast majority of US consumption was legal: of the 57 viewings, 54 of these
were legal.
According to Table 3, which describes the college students, of the 23 unpaid
consumption episodes, 10.7 were Chinese movies, 9.3 were legal foreign movies, and 3
were illegal foreign movies. Of the 8 paid movies, 4.4 were legal domestic movies, 3.4
were legal foreign movies, and 0.2 were illegal foreign movies. Table 4 describes the
online sample. This population has similar patterns. Domestic authorized movies occupy
the largest share, followed by foreign authorized movies. Unpaid consumption of foreign
unauthorized movies accounts for roughly a tenth of movie viewings in these samples.

5

Empirical Strategy and Results
We ask two broad questions. First, descriptively, what are the determinants of paid

and unpaid movie consumption? Part of the motivation is to find plausible sources of
exogenous variation in unpaid movie consumption that can be used to identify the sales
displacement effect of unpaid on paid consumption. Second, we seek to measure the
displacement rate: how much does an instance of unpaid movie consumption displace
paid movie consumption in China? We pose the latter displacement question using both
cross sectional and longitudinal approaches, applied to the two data sets.
Determinants of Movie Consumption
We create simple cross-section datasets indicating the total number of movies
watched – by each of the paid and unpaid means – by each individual, along with the
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individual’s characteristics. Table 5 uses regressions to describe how paid and unpaid
movie consumption varies across respondents in the two samples. The first two columns
report regressions on the student sample. Both paid and unpaid consumption rise sharply
in self-reported interest in movies: those reporting the highest level of interest watch 9
more paid and 34 more unpaid movies than those reporting the lowest level of interest.
Paid consumption rises with family income, and unpaid consumption falls – although not
statistically significantly – with income. Men watch substantially more – 11 more –
unpaid movies, while women watch 2 more paid movies.
The latter two columns of Table 5 report regression results for the Internet user
sample. Here too paid consumption rises systematically with interest in movies and with
income. Unpaid consumption rises sharply in movie interest and falls sharply in income.
As with the college students, men watch less paid movies and more unpaid movies than
women.
Displacement
The most basic way to measure sales displacement is simply by asking whether
respondents who have more unpaid instances of movie consumption have fewer paid
instances. An immediate problem with this approach is that people who like movies may
like them in both paid and unpaid modes, which would give rise to a positive correlation,
even if no complementary relationship exists. What is needed, in principle, is a measure
of interest in movies. Conditional on a respondent’s level of interest in movies, the
question is whether those who do more unpaid viewing do less paid viewing.
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The first 5 columns of Table 6 report cross sectional regressions of paid
consumptions on unpaid consumption and controls for the college student sample. In
column (1), a regression of paid viewing on unpaid consumption yields a coefficient of 0.015, which is insignificantly different from zero. Including dummies for a self-reported
level of interest in movies and income levels changes the displacement coefficient to 0.066, which is three times the absolute value of its standard error. This estimate implies
sales displacement of 15:1. These results are robust to the inclusion of other covariates,
or interaction terms with interest (column 4 and 5). However, because our measure of
interest in movies is likely imperfect, the true level of displacement is probably higher.
The latter half of Table 6 (columns 6-10) repeats the exercise of the first half using
the Internet user survey. Most variables enter with similar signs and magnitudes in the
online sample. The coefficients on the movie interest dummies are monotonically
increasing, as are the movie attendance coefficients. However, with these data, the
displacement coefficient is precisely estimated to be near zero.
Although we have direct measures of the respondents’ interest in movies among the
variables in the data (interest in movies, frequency of theater attendance, etc.), there is
still a possibility that unobserved determinants of movie consumption will contaminate
the cross sectional approach. If the approach is biased toward producing positive
coefficients – or, equivalently, biased toward producing evidence against sales
displacement – then findings of negative and zero displacement have rather different
interpretations. A negative estimated coefficient in a context biased toward positive
findings is informative, suggesting that the true rate of displacement is even more
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negative. A positive estimated coefficient, while on its face suggestive of a stimulating
relationship between unpaid and paid consumption, is less informative; it simply means
that the true relationship is less positive than the estimated relationship.
A second approach to measuring sales displacement exploits the panel nature of the
data to deal with fixed unobserved heterogeneity. Define Piv as the number of movies
from vintage v that person i consumes via paid means, and define Uiv analogously. Then:
,
where µi is an individual fixed effect and µv is a vintage effect. The coefficient α
measures displacement by asking whether a person has more or less paid consumption
from vintages in which they have more unpaid consumption, after accounting for the
average vintage effect (movies released that year are more popular) and the individual’s
fixed effect (reflecting his time-constant taste for movies). The vector X contains timevarying individual characteristics, such as class year and age. Column (1) in Table 7
reports the results of the college student sample. Note that an observation in this setup is
an individual-vintage pair. That is, the dependent variable is, for example, the
individual’s number of paid viewings of movies released in 2006. Using all of the
college student data, the displacement rate is -0.135, meaning that one instance of unpaid
consumption displaces one seventh of paid consumption.
Pooling all movies is potentially misleading, since illegal movies are not available for
paid consumption. Therefore, we further look at the displacement rate within legal
foreign and legal domestic movies separately in columns (2) and (4). The displacement
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rate for legal foreign movies is slightly smaller than the rate overall, about 1:7.4. The
displacement rate for domestic movies is higher, at 1:5.6.
The above specification assumes there are no displacement effects across movie types.
To relax this assumption, in columns (3) and (5), we examine how the unpaid
consumption of three types of movies affects the paid consumptions of legal foreign and
legal domestic movies. These two types of movies exhibit opposite patterns. Unpaid
foreign legal consumption displaces paid foreign legal consumption at a rate of -0.124,
while unpaid domestic consumption displaces paid foreign legal consumption at about 0.043. Similarly, the within-type displacement rate of paid domestic consumption is 0.197, while the across-type displacement rate is positive, 0.063. Taken literally, the
positive coefficient implies that unpaid consumption of foreign movies stimulates paid
consumption of domestic movies, although the coefficient is small in magnitude.
The latter half of Table 7 repeats the longitudinal estimation exercise with the Internet
user sample. The overall displacement estimate, which was -0.14 in the college student
sample, is 0.005 (and insignificantly different from zero, in column 6) for the Internet
users. Other estimates vary between 0.05 and -0.07, and while some are statistically
discernible from zero, none are far from zero. These estimates stand in fairly sharp
contrast with the US estimates in RW. The longitudinal approach yields an estimate of
1:1 displacement, compared with the estimates here that lie between zero and -0.14.
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6

Concluding Discussion
While an analogous study including a comparable US population finds a large sales

displacement rate, we find rather different results for Chinese consumers. First, the
Chinese respondents view fewer movies (30 vs 50 from a comparable list). Second,
unpaid consumption makes up a far larger share of consumption for the Chinese
respondents (roughly three quarters rather than about 5 percent). Third, econometric
estimates of sales displacement are far smaller for the Chinese samples. While the US
estimates based on the longitudinal approach employed above indicate roughly 1:1
displacement, the estimates on the Chinese data in this study are between 0 and -0.14.
These results, on their face, suggest small damages from movie piracy in China
despite large volumes of unpaid consumption. Before drawing this conclusion, however,
it is important to understand the reason for the reason for the stark difference between
results for the US and China. We can offer some speculation along these lines.
One possible explanation for the low Chinese displacement rate – suggested by lower
overall movie consumption in China – is that Chinese students’ time budgets are not as
strained as the U.S. students’. A relaxed time budget could accommodate additional
unpaid consumption without reducing paid consumption. Related, those spending
additional time with unpaid movies may be scaling back the time they spend with other
non-moviegoing activities, such as television or reading.
A second possible explanation is that unpaid consumption of movies released
between 2006 and 2008 does not come at the expense of a pre-existing tendency for
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consumers to pay for movies in China. That is, US audiences have generally paid for
their movies, and recent opportunities for unpaid consumption represent a change. The
response to this change in the US sample has been a replacement of paid by unpaid
consumption. It is possible that in China, by contrast, unpaid consumption has a longer
history, and the period under study may not contain a change in unpaid consumption
opportunities. Rather than substituting unpaid for paid consumption, Chinese
respondents may simply be substituting one form of digital unpaid consumption for
physical unpaid consumption, which would show up as zero sales displacement.
Additional studies of sales displacement from piracy will be useful for determining
whether the differing displacement patterns for the US and China withstand additional
scrutiny. If so, then determining which of these explanations, if any, explains the
conflicting results is an important topic for future research.
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Figure 1: A Simple Demand Model
1.1: No unpaid consumption
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Table 1: Summary of Respondents’ Characteristics
Background Characteristics
Student Sample
Online Sample
(obs=372)
(obs=3852)
Gender
Female
51.6%
37.0%
Male
48.4%
63.0%
(17--30)
(11--68)
Age
Mean
20.23
29.56
25 percentile
19.75
25
Median
20
28
75 percentile
21
33
College Year
Freshman
0.54%
Sophomore
43.1%
College junior
46.1%
College Senior
9.8%
Annual Family Income/ Monthly
Income*
Below $2930/below $220
18.8%
14.8%
$2930-7320/$220-440
31.8%
35.3%
$7320-14640/$440-730
29.2%
28.2%
$14640-29280/$730-1020
15.6%
10.4%
Above $29280/above $1020
4.6%
11.2%
Computer
Have no computer or regular access
0%
0.18%
Own computer or have regular access
100%
99.82%
Internet Access in 2008
No internet access
0.27%
0.88%
Dial-up
0.82%
12.5%
Broadband
98.9%
86.6%
Internet Access in 2007
No internet access
0.28%
2.88%
Dial-up
3.64%
14.7%
Broadband
96.1%
82.5%
Internet Access in 2006
No internet access
12.0%
7.53%
Dial-up
7.45%
16.7%
Broadband
80.5%
75.8%
DVD/VCD Burner
Yes
63.6%
81.7%
No
36.4%
18.3%
Interest in Movies**
A lot less
1.62%
0.23%
A bit less
5.39%
0.47%
Average
43.7%
21.6%
A bit more
35.6%
51.6%
A lot more
13.8%
26.2%
Notes: Table continued in following page.
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(continued from previous page)
Frequency to Movie Theaters
Never
55.3%
16.1%
Once a month or less
38.5%
37.1%
Two or three times a month
6.2%
34.5%
More than three times a month
0%
12.4%
Notes: * Student sample is asked about annual family income, and online sample monthly
income; Chinese currency is converted to US dollars.
** the questions is phrased as ‘Compared to other people you know, how big a movie
fan are you?’.
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Table 2: Respondent Movie Viewings, by Mode (Student sample)

Paid
Theater
Legally purchase
TV
Rental
Unpaid
Download
Online/burned DVD
Borrow
Illegally purchase
Total

All
viewings
8.0
6.7
0.1
0.8
0.4
23.1
17.8
3.9
0.5
0.8
31.1

First

Second

Third

7.7
6.5
0.1
0.8
0.3
22.2
17.3
3.7
0.5
0.7
29.9

0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.8
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.1
1.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
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Table 3: Respondent Movie Viewings, by Movie Type
Student Sample

8.0
6.7

Foreign Authorized
Movies
3.37
2.98

Domestic Authorized
Movies
4.41
3.61

Unauthorize
d Movies
0.21
0.10

0.1

0.07

0.05

0.01

0.8
0.4
23.1
17.8

0.19
0.13
9.32
7.19

0.59
0.17
10.73
8.34

0.04
0.05
3.02
2.30

3.9

1.56

1.87

0.52

0.5

0.21

0.21

0.07

0.8

0.37

0.31

0.13

31.1

12.69

15.15

3.23

Total
Paid
Theater
Legally
purchase
TV
Rental
Unpaid
Download
Online/burned
DVD
Borrow
Illegally
purchase
Total
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Table 4: Respondent Movie Viewings, by Movie Type
Online Sample

11.52
5.99
1.67
2.80
1.06
21.88
10.33

Foreign Authorized
Movies
3.98
2.31
0.63
0.64
0.40
7.88
3.70

Domestic
Authorized Movies
6.42
3.15
0.82
1.95
0.50
10.99
5.20

Unauthorized
Movies
1.11
0.54
0.22
0.20
0.16
3.01
1.43

9.78
0.82

3.54
0.28

4.91
0.43

1.33
0.11

0.94
33.40

0.36
11.86

0.45
17.42

0.13
4.13

Total
Paid
Theater
Legally purchase
TV
Rental
Unpaid
Download
Online/burned
DVD
Borrow
Illegally
purchase
Total
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Table 5: Paid and Unpaid Movie Consumption

Movie Interest Category
2

Student Sample
Paid
Unpaid
(1)
(2)
2.368
7.369

Online Sample
Paid
Unpaid
(3)
(4)
-1.291
1.891

(3.967)
(7.221)
(5.641)
Interest Category 3
3.834
19.23
2.935
(3.555)
(6.472)**
(4.632)
Interest Category 4
7.204
26.20
7.757
(3.582)*
(6.520)**
(4.620)
Interest Category 5
9.558
34.06
11.584
(3.704)*
(6.742)**
(4.634)*
Female
2.359
-11.22
1.174
(0.993)*
(1.807)**
(0.464)*
Have DVD burner
0.745
-0.182
1.958
(1.009)
(1.836)
(0.593)**
Income Category 2
-0.251
0.790
1.753
(1.3560)
(2.468)
(0.692)*
Income Category 3
1.848
-1.577
4.113
(1.405)
(2.557)
(0.721)**
Income Category 4
2.639
-4.261
5.973
(1.638)
(2.982)
(0.914)**
Income Category 5
5.990
4.683
4.425
(2.477)*
(4.509)
(0.898)**
College Sophomore
4.462
-1.788
(6.101)
(11.10)
College Junior
5.195
1.520
(6.087)
(11.079)
College Senior
4.569
-3.407
(6.227)
(11.33)
Beyond College
6.392
-10.42
(8.583)
(15.62)
Constant
-5.071
7.459
-1.070
(6.963)
(12.67)
(4.626)
Observations
335
335
3852
R-squared
0.15
0.27
0.08
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

(8.111)
9.690
(6.660)
18.423
(6.644)**
22.247
(6.664)**
-5.898
(0.667)**
2.254
(0.853)**
-2.569
(0.995)**
-5.981
(1.037)**
-8.722
(1.314)**
-14.290
(1.292)**
9.908
(6.653)
3852
0.10
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Table 6: Cross Sectional Regressions with Different Observables
Paid Consumption

Unpaid Consumptions

(1)
-0.015
(0.024)

Movie Interest Category 2
Interest Category 3
Interest Category 4
Interest Category 5
Once per month
2-3 times per month
Above 3 times per month
Income Category 2
Income Category 3
Income Category 4
Income Category 5
College Sophomore
College Junior
College Senior
Beyond College
Female

-

(2)
-0.060
(0.021)**
2.287
(3.261)
2.494
(2.947)
4.827
(2.993)
7.318
(3.147)*
6.366
(0.794)**
16.019
(1.566)**
-

Student Sample
(3)
-0.066
(0.022)**
2.465
(3.189)
2.881
(2.895)
5.181
(2.944)
7.855
(3.099)*
6.505
(0.817)**
16.418
(1.612)**
0.294
(1.075)
1.291
(1.106)
0.899
(1.300)
4.459
(1.939)*

(4)
-0.052
(0.025)*
2.430
(3.238)
2.559
(2.951)
4.642
(3.013)
7.404
(3.164)*
6.383
(0.849)**
16.349
(1.637)**
-

(5)
-0.051
(0.025)*
3.904
(3.912)
2.744
(3.627)
5.321
(3.743)
8.945
(3.951)*
6.420
(0.852)**
16.265
(1.645)**
-

0.247
(1.102)
1.277
(1.141)
0.723
(1.332)
4.687
(2.037)*
2.371
(4.963)
2.690
(4.959)
1.824
(5.079)
5.640
(7.015)
0.807
(0.851)

0.123
(1.109)
1.215
(1.151)
0.796
(1.340)
4.372
(2.056)*
2.621
(4.999)
2.954
(4.998)
2.025
(5.122)
5.880
(7.042)
2.721
(6.028)

-

Online Sample
(8)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.978
(4.743)
1.447
(3.900)
3.684
(3.898)
5.052
(3.915)
3.121
(0.568)**
9.193
(0.608)**
12.943
(0.791)**
0.283
(0.584)
1.585
(0.613)**
1.971
(0.781)*
-0.540
(0.791)
-

(9)
0.009
(0.009)
-0.970
(4.741)
1.389
(3.899)
3.635
(3.897)
5.042
(3.914)
3.054
(0.569)**
9.127
(0.608)**
12.860
(0.792)**
0.353
(0.585)
1.678
(0.615)**
2.090
(0.783)**
-0.456
(0.792)
-

(10)
0.009
(0.010)
-2.944
(5.819)
0.605
(4.783)
2.627
(4.776)
0.000
(0.000)
3.084
(0.570)**
9.161
(0.610)**
12.912
(0.794)**
0.358
(0.586)
1.670
(0.616)**
2.085
(0.784)**
-0.479
(0.793)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.710
(0.394)

-1.885
(8.222)

(6)
0.003
(0.010)

(7)
0.006
(0.009)
-1.045
(4.751)
1.526
(3.907)
3.803
(3.906)
5.153
(3.922)
3.247
(0.565)**
9.460
(0.593)**
12.957
(0.757)**

-
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Constant

8.120
1.806
0.912
-1.813
-2.640
10.353
0.573
0.122
-0.165
0.693
(0.719)**
(2.856)
(2.910)
(5.701)
(6.080)
(0.295)**
(3.879)
(3.888)
(3.890)
(4.761)
With Interaction Terms
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Observations
372
370
344
338
338
3852
3852
3852
3852
3852
R-squared
0.00
0.35
0.39
0.40
0.40
0.00
0.15
0.16
0.16
0.16
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In column (5) and (10), we include interest and gender interaction terms. Including other
interaction terms with interest gives very similar results, which are not shown in this table.
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Table 7: Longitudinal Displacement Estimates
Paid
Consumption
(1)
Unpaid
Consumption

Student Sample
Paid Consumption
(Foreign Films)
(2)
(3)

-0.135
(0.024)**

Unpaid
Consumption
(Foreign
Authorized Films)

-0.135
(0.025)**

-0.124
(0.026)**

Unpaid
Consumption
(Domestic
Authorized Films)

-0.043
(0.025)

Unpaid
Consumption
(Unauthorized
Films)

-0.066
(0.049)

2007 Vintage

Paid Consumption
(Domestic Films)
(4)
(5)

0.068
(0.027)*

-0.179
(0.026)**

Paid
Consumption
(6)
0.005
(0.008)

Online Sample
Paid Consumption
(Foreign Films)
(7)
(8)

0.018
(0.009)*

Paid Consumption
(Domestic Films)
(9)
(10)

0.011
(0.009)

-0.197
(0.026)**

0.004
(0.008)

0.056
(0.052)

0.057
(0.015)**

0.049
(0.011)**

-0.057
(0.010)**

-0.069
(0.010)**

0.018
(0.019)

-0.245
0.206
0.219
-0.454
-0.460
(0.131)
(0.073)** (0.073)**
(0.092)** (0.092)**
2008 Vintage
0.883
0.303
0.305
0.639
0.628
(0.245)**
(0.136)*
(0.136)*
(0.171)** (0.171)**
Observations
11556
11556
11556
11556
11556
R-squared
0.11
0.05
0.05
0.13
0.14
Note: All regressions include individual fixed effects and age dummies; column (1)-(5) include grade dummy as well. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%.

0.085
(0.584)
-0.235
(1.133)
1071
0.005

0.437
(0.356)
0.040
(0.690)
1071
0.008

0.365
(0.357)
-0.113
(0.692)
1071
0.008

-0.301
(0.376)
-0.311
(0.731)
1071
0.025

-0.306
(0.376)
-0.322
(0.728)
1071
0.041
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